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A B S T R ACT. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court situates its opinion within the history
of laws banning sodomy. Lawrence, however, is also part of another historical narrative: the
history of attempts by federal lawmakers and judges to define the relationships among the genus
of illicit sex, the genus of licit sex, and marriage. Viewed from this perspective, Lawrence marks
the latest intervention in a legal conversation that began when Congress enacted the 1907
Immigration Act and the 191o Mann Act, each of which prohibited the movement of women
across borders- the former, international, the latter, interstate -for "immoral purposes." In the
early twentieth century, through these provisions, lawmakers and judges constructed an
isomorphic relationship between marriage/nonmarriage and licit sex/illicit sex. The "marriage
cure" transported sex across the illicit/licit divide. But courts and legislators came to view these
curative powers as a threat to marriage's place in the sociolegal order because individuals used
marriage as a tool to evade legal penalties. Thus, they checked the powers of the marriage cure
and, in so doing, uncoupled both parts of their original isomorphism. Lawrence represents the
culmination of this process: the movement of a sexual relationship across the illicit/licit divide at
least in part because it made no claim to marriage. This move reflects the persistent status of
marriage as simultaneously powerful in its ability to confer legal privileges and to shield people
from the dangers of sexual illicitness, and powerless to protect itself from the taint of those same
illicit practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Ask yourself what common features unite the following list of practices:
bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity. To be sure, each of these practices
involves sexualized conduct of one sort or another. Apart from their general
sexual character, however, these forms of erotic expression seem to share
precious little in common. They involve a wide spectrum of hedonic
preferences and an extremely varied range of acts. Moreover, they evoke wildly
disparate social meanings and cultural referents. In the minds of most people,
for example, having sex with a stranger for money has little in common with
having sex with an animal. Having sex with a sibling seems quite different
from having sex with a partner who is not your spouse. Being married to two
people simultaneously seems quite unlike autoeroticism.
These dissimilarities notwithstanding, the law unites these divergent
practices into a coherent category. These are all forms of sexual expression that
have traditionally met with legal disapproval and, quite often, criminal
sanctions In fact, in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia invokes
these practices seriatim for precisely this reason. After the Court's opinion
overturning Bowers v. Hardwick and striking down as unconstitutional Texas's
same-sex sodomy statute, Justice Scalia bemoans predictively, all of these
traditionally illicit practices will be protected by the Constitution and will lie
beyond the reach of state regulation.2 Justice Scalia is so confident about the
potential repercussions of Lawrence that, based solely on the argument in his
dissent, one would think that the Court's opinion in Lawrence rendered
unintelligible, within the parameters of the Federal Constitution, any legal
category of illicit sex-that is, of legally disfavored sexual practices subject to
restriction or prohibition.
On its own terms, however, the Court's opinion in Lawrence does no such
thing.' Despite the depth of Justice Scalia's ire, his dissent and Justice
1. Although masturbation is not criminal, legal actors have long identified it as a social evil. See
Geoffrey P. Miller, Law, Self-Pollution, and the Management of Social Anxiety, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER&L. 221,222 (2001).
z. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Others have analyzed the narrowness of Lawrence in various respects. See, e.g., Katherine M.
Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REv.
1399 (2004); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Lawrence & the Road from Liberation to Equality, 46 S.
TEX. L. REv. 309 (2004); Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened
Scrutiny, 1O2 MICH. L. REV. 1528 (2004); David D. Meyer, Domesticating Lawrence, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 453; Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1615
(2004).
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Kennedy's opinion for the Court notably share a common commitment to
maintaining a robust category of sexual practices that can be legally prohibited;
they simply disagree about whether or not same-sex sodomy belongs in that
category. According to Justice Kennedy, although states may no longer
criminalize private, adult, consensual, same-sex sodomy, they may still
criminalize other forms of sexual behavior. States remain entitled to draw this
distinction because, in the Court's view, these other forms of still-illicit
intimacy are meaningfully different than the type of sexual relationship at stake
in and protected by Lawrence. Justice Scalia's dissent notwithstanding, then,
the Court's opinion in Lawrence actually takes pains to reinforce the existence
of an intelligible legal line between illicit and licit sex, even as the watershed
holding moves across the line one particular form of intimacy -private,
consensual sex between adults of the same sex.
To locate the line between licit and illicit sexual expression, Lawrence
carefully distinguishes the relationship between John Geddes Lawrence and
Tyron Garner, the defendants in the case, from the traditionally prohibited
forms of sexual expression allegedly unaffected by the Court's holding
(presumably, relationships and practices such as those on Justice Scalia's list of
horribles). In drawing these distinctions, the opinion's language implicitly
delineates some of the respective features of licit and illicit sex.4 For instance,
the Court points out, the sex between Lawrence and Garner involved only two
people (a traditional marker of licitness); it was not polyamorous (a traditional
marker of illicitness).' Both partners were of majority (a marker of licitness), so
there was no concern about either sex between minors (a marker of illicitness)
or sex between an adult and a minor (another marker of illicitness).6 The sex
was consensual (licit), not coercive (illicit). 7 Furthermore, in three salient
senses, the sexual relationship between Lawrence and Garner was private
4. In upholding a Florida statute that prohibits gays and lesbians from adopting children, the
Eleventh Circuit quoted this very paragraph of the Lawrence opinion to differentiate the facts
in the case before it-involving a gay couple and their foster children-from the facts of
Lawrence. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th
Cir. 2004). The Utah District Court also quoted this paragraph in upholding the state's ban
on polygamy after Lawrence. See Bronson v. Swensen, No. 2:04-CV-21 TS, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2374, at *12 (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2005) (order denying plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
s. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("The case does involve two adults...." (emphasis added)).
6. Id. ("The present case does not involve minors.").
7. Id. ("[The case] does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused .... The case does
involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.").
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(licit), not public (illicit). 8 First, the sexual acts in question occurred in a home,
not in public space. 9 Second, the relationship did not involve the public
market, that is, prostitution.1" Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
relationship was about gratifying personal commitments and desires, not about
claiming public rights or entitlements. As the Court states, the relationship
between Lawrence and Garner did "not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter."" Lawrence and Garner, in other words, never sought to formalize their
relationship as a marriage. Seeking such public entitlements, of course, would
not have been illicit in the sense that prostitution or sex in public spaces are
illicit; that is, attempting to marry would not have subjected Lawrence and
Garner to criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, the Court's analysis suggests that
the absence of any claim to the public goods of marriage -like the absence of
sexual acts in public spaces or the public market economy- influenced its
decision to view the sex between Lawrence and Garner as entitled to
constitutional protection. The absence of a claim to marriage, in other words,
seemingly bolstered the licit nature of Lawrence and Garner's conduct-
conduct that, in the Court's words, was not simply about sexual satisfaction
but rather could constitute "but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring."'2
Notably, given the Court's pointed analysis, none of the legal arguments
raised in the Lawrence litigation involved marriage at all. Lawrence and Garner
never intimated to the Court the slightest desire for either the social trappings
or the legal privileges of marriage. Yet each of the three major opinions in the
case-Justice Kennedy's opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurrence, and Justice
Scalia's dissent-shadow boxes with the specter of same-sex marriage. Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor each take pains to distinguish their respective
arguments from those that would favor a right to same-sex marriage. If
Lawrence and Garner had sought to marry, Justice Kennedy suggests, that
would have been different. Likewise, in her concurrence holding the Texas
sodomy statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, Justice
O'Connor differentiates between the unconstitutional prohibition of same-sex
sex and the constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage. According to
8. Id. ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives."). On different notions of
privacy in this constitutional context-that is, "zonal, relational, and decisional" - see
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1443 (1992).
9. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("[The case] does not involve public conduct..
1o. See id. ("[The case] does not involve... prostitution.").
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 567.
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Justice O'Connor, Texas could not punish the relationship between Lawrence
and Garner because the state "cannot assert any legitimate state interest here,
such as ...preserving the traditional institution of marriage."13 That case
would be different, she posits, because "[u]nlike the moral disapproval of
same-sex relations - the asserted state interest in this case - other reasons exist
to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group.1 4 By contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent envisions a direct
slippery slope between the holding in Lawrence and constitutional protection
for same-sex marriage. In different ways, then, each of these opinions goes out
of its way to link the movement of a sexual activity over the illicit-licit line to
the institution of marriage, despite the fact that the case involved no claim to
marriage. Legal discussions of licit and illicit sex seemingly raise the specter of
marriage even when the parties to the particular case do not.
This Article is about the relationships among legal definitions of sexual
illicitness, legal definitions of sexual licitness, and legal constructions of
marriage. It argues that Lawrence's modern approach to defining these
relationships should be understood in light of the history of judges' and
lawmakers' attempts to use marriage to locate and police the boundary between
the categories of licit and illicit sex. In this Article, therefore, I situate Lawrence
not within the historical context offered by the opinion itself- the history of
sodomy laws and the legal regulation of same-sex sex"s- but rather within the
history of past federal attempts to define a broad category of illicit sex.
Specifically, I analyze the intertwined histories of two federal statutory
provisions that created explicit legal categories of illicit sex: the "immoral
purpose" provisions of the Immigration Act of 1907 and the White-Slave
Traffic Act of 191o (also known as the Mann Act). Each of these provisions
prohibited the movement of women across certain borders - the former,
international, the latter, interstate -for either prostitution or "other immoral
purposes."' 6 The limiting contours of this vague "immoral purpose" language
lay in the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis: When a law refers to
something specific - like "prostitution" - and then refers to a more general
category-like "immoral purpose"-the general category should be construed
13. Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. Id.
i. See id. at 568-71 (majority opinion); see also Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
16. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2000)); Act of February 20, 1907 (Immigration Act of 1907), ch. 1134,
34 Stat. 898.
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to apply to things that are of the same type, or genus, as the specific term. 7
The statutory provisions, in other words, did not apply to all forms of immoral
behavior, only sexual immoralities, of which prostitution was understood to be
the prototype." These provisions of the Immigration and White-Slave Traffic
Acts thus forced courts and lawmakers to define, however unscientifically, the
elements of the genus of sexual immorality. In so doing, they eschewed
philosophical notions of immorality and, with little explicit methodology,
classified what forms of sexual expression properly inhabited the category of
illicit sex.
These "immoral purpose" provisions, therefore, offered judges and
lawmakers the occasion to think carefully about the broad category of
prohibited sexual relations-a category that hovers ominously over legal
discussions of particular forbidden practices, such as same-sex sodomy in
Lawrence, but one that judges and lawmakers rarely confront directly. In the
context of the Immigration Act and the Mann Act, judges and lawmakers
confronted the content and contours of illicit sex not, as in Lawrence, to
determine what forms of intimate behavior lay beyond the reach of state
regulation, but rather to determine what forms of intimate behavior lay within
the reach of federal regulation.
This history of the "immoral purpose" provisions is not the narrow
doctrinal history of Lawrence. The Supreme Court surely did not need to advert
to this history to answer the constitutional question of whether Texas's
sodomy law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 These statutory provisions,
17. On this principle of interpretation, see RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 135-37
(John Bell & George Engle eds., 3d ed. 1995); and Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 1O9 HARv. L. REV.
923, 937-38 (1996).
18. On the social and legal place of prostitution, see RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD:
PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA, 190o-1918 (1982). Other laws defining who could become a
member of the American polity invoked morality to refer to broader types of behavior. See,
e.g., Note, Naturalization and the Adjudication of Good Moral Character: An Exercise in Judicial
Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545 (1972) (analyzing the meaning of "good moral character"
in the context of naturalization law). On the ambiguity of the meaning of prostitution, the
core of the genus in question, see infra text accompanying notes 53-69.
1g. Although these statutes suggest a relationship between legal rules and larger notions of
morality, this Article does not seek to intervene in either the age-old debate about the
relationship between law and morals or in the current discussion about the state of morals
regulation after Lawrence. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004); Nan D.
Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1112-13 (2004). Instead, this Article
explores how the language of sexual morality was interpreted by judges and lawmakers
engaged in the particular project of defining the spheres of licit and illicit sex.
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however, constitute the broader history of when, at different moments in the
past, legal actors have attempted to resolve the core quandary that the Court
confronted in Lawrence: how to draw an intelligible legal line between sexual
licitness and illicitness against a messy backdrop of diverse social practices and
noisy cultural commentary. Situating Lawrence in this historical context -when
lawmakers contemplating the meaning of sexual licitness and illicitness were
preoccupied with trafficking in women, not the rights of same-sex couples -
clarifies that Lawrence is about not only the right of two men or two women to
engage in particular erotic acts, but also the broader question of how and why
the law privileges certain forms of sexual expression as markers of good
citizenship while it denounces other forms of sexual expression as markers of
criminality.2"
I argue that the history of the enactment and interpretation of the "immoral
purpose" provisions of the Immigration Act and the Mann Act suggests that
the legal genus of illicit sex has been persistently constructed in relation to the
archetypal legal site for licit sex: marriage. Through the construction and
interpretation of these statutory provisions, legal actors first constructed and
then dismantled an isomorphism between marriage/nonmarriage and licit
sex/illicit sex. Lawrence, I argue, represents the final dismantling of this
isomorphism. If, historically, marriage was the sine qua non of licit sex and
nonmarriage necessarily marked sex as illicit, Lawrence turns that construct on
its head by linking the licit nature of same-sex sex to its location outside of
legal marriage.
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that marriage has played a pivotal role in the
legal regulation of sex. American judges were not the first people to equate
marriage and sexual licitness -this link had deep roots in Christian
constructions of sexual morality that posited marriage as the site where lust
was transformed into virtue.2 To say that, historically, courts and lawmakers
zo. As the Court notes in Lawrence, Texas's sodomy law, while "purport[ing] to do no more
than prohibit a particular sexual act," 539 U.S. at 567, actually restricted what other
countries already recognized as "an integral part of human freedom," id. at 576. On the role
of sexual conduct in defining contemporary notions of citizenship, see LAUREN BERLANT,
THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 1-10
(1997). Similarly, borders have been critical sites for defining citizenship-that is who is
entitled to be a member of the polity. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak & Left Volpp, Introduction:
Legal Borderlands: Law and the Construction of American Borders, 57 AM. Q. 593, 594 (2oo5).
Situating Lawrence in the history of federal laws regulating national and state borders thus
highlights the connections between the citizenship stakes of Lawrence and other legal sites
where citizenship has been defined.
21. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW
IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 3 (1997). Early Christian doctrine had denounced even
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did not reason philosophically about sexual immorality is not to imply that
their legal views were not influenced by nonlegal philosophical approaches,
particularly religious principles. Though marriage in the United States was a
civil institution, Christian constructions of the relationship perpetually shaped
legal views of marriage.22 Legal actors' choice to use the language of morality to
regulate sexual practices surely reflected their inherent comfort with the
religious language of sexual classifications. Undoubtedly, in fact, they reasoned
in a commonsensical, imprecise manner in these areas precisely because they
were operating within a presumed shared, quasi-religious framework.
These inchoate religious underpinnings, however, did not determine the
precise legal architecture that courts and legislatures would erect to regulate the
specifics of licit sexual conduct and the doctrinal ramifications of illicit behavior
in a system that professed a complete separation from religion. Thus, although
the basic legal equation of marriage and sexual licitness, on the one hand, and
nonmarriage and sexual illicitness, on the other, is hardly shocking, early-
twentieth-century judges and lawmakers quickly confronted the complexities
of building and maintaining such a simple typology within the law.
Indeed, the history of the legal meaning of "immoral purpose" -language
taken from federal statutory provisions that, on their face, did not regulate
marriage - reveals a fraught relationship between marriage and legally immoral
sexual relationships and, thus, between the genera of licit and illicit sex. 3 On
the one hand, through the enactment and interpretation of these acts
regulating various forms of nonmarital intimacy, lawmakers and judges
constructed marriage as both the antithesis of immoral sex and as a cure for
legal immorality. 4 In this respect, the "marriage cure" held the potential to
"chaste" marital sex in favor of celibacy. See ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, CHRISTIANITY
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 45 (2000).
22. See, e.g., NANCY F. COT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 6
(2000); Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and
Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1988). I am grateful to Nancy Cott for pushing me on
this point.
23. On the intersections of federal law and family law, see, for example, Libby S. Adler,
Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197 (1999); Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law,
Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism
and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family
Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 175 (2000); Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and
the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991); and Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 1i5 HARv. L. REV. 947
(2002).
24. In this Article, in other words, I explore the meaning of marriage by examining the history
of federal statutes that explicitly regulated other practices -immigration and interstate
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transform a relationship from legally immoral to legally moral. If parties
engaged in illicit sex became spouses, their sex was usually brought within the
law's protective aegis. On the other hand, the history of the "immoral purpose"
language in the 1907 Immigration Act and the 191o White-Slave Traffic Act
also reveals the perceived dangers of the powerful "marriage cure," dangers
inherent in the ability of individuals engaged in illicit sexual practices to marry
for the purely instrumental reason of evading legal penalties. The powers of
marriage, in other words, created incentives for individuals to avail themselves
of its cure. Lawmakers perceived such instrumental uses of marriage as a threat
to marriage's proper status as the bedrock of the sociopolitical order and, thus,
in both the immigration law and Mann Act contexts, judges and legislators
ultimately restricted the reach of marriage's curative powers. In so doing, they
depicted marriage not as a potent check on sexual immorality, but as a fragile
institution capable of being hopelessly tainted by contact with immoral sexual
practices. In the name of preserving marriage, therefore, certain relationships
were deemed so corrosive of marriage that they lay beyond the reach of the
powers of the marriage cure.
Throughout this history of the law's doctrine and language (rather than its
enforcement), I start from the premise that-in the past and the present-legal
notions of sexual illicitness shape people's intimate identities and their chosen
forms of erotic expression, even if most people are never prosecuted for
violating the law's regulations. As discussed below, judges certainly enforced
the "immoral purpose" provisions of the 1907 Immigration Act and the 191o
Mann Act.2" But most people-even those who violated the terms of these
acts-evaded prosecution. Nonetheless, legal definitions of sexual illicitness
exert powerful, albeit inchoate, forces that affect people's intimate lives. Some
might alter their sexual relationships to avoid violating formal legal
proscriptions, even those that are rarely, if ever, enforced. 6 Others might fear
that their illicit behavior, even if never prosecuted, could affect other aspects of
movement of women. As I have argued elsewhere, lawmakers often defined marriage
through laws that regulated the legal status of unmarried persons. In so doing, they
adjudicated the legal rights of unmarried people by situating them in a relationship to
marriage, a legal institution they had not chosen to enter. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the
Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112
YALE L.J. 1641 (2003).
25. On the history of the enforcement of the Mann Act, see DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER
THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN AcT (1994).
26. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202 (4 th Cir. 1986) (dismissing for lack of a case or
controversy plaintiffs' claims that Virginia's unenforced fornication law had a chilling effect
on plaintiffs' sex lives); Berg v. State, iOO P.3d 261 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (dismissing on
standing grounds a post-Lawrence challenge to the state's sodomy and fornication statutes).
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their legal status.27 Still others, even in the absence of any realistic fear of
prosecution, might experience themselves as less-than-equal citizens if their
intimate identities are expressed in practices that the law constructs as within
the genus of illicit sex.28
The "immoral purpose" provisions of the 1907 Immigration Act and the
191o White-Slave Traffic Act conjured into being the genus of illicit sex
through laws that directly linked intimate behavior and citizenship insofar as
they regulated people's movement across borders. The central sexual practice at
the heart of these legal conversations was the perceived problem of trafficking
in women, across both international and domestic borders.2 9 This Article is
27. See, e.g., S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 663 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Payne, J., concurring)
(citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as a reason to deny custody to a gay
parent); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987) (relying on Bowers to
uphold the statutory ban on homosexual adoption).
28. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
same sex couples must be allowed to marry because the state constitution "forbids the
creation of second-class citizens").
29. The legal history of these acts, then, necessarily intersects with the social history of the
early-twentieth-century panic over the so-called white-slave trade, a topic that, in turn,
implicates the history of the legal regulation of prostitution. My goal in this Article is not to
enter the debate about how widespread the problem of the white-slave trade actually was.
This was contested terrain in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., White Slave Traffic:
Presentment of the Additional Grand Jury for the January Term of the Court of General
Sessions in the County of New York, in the Matter of the Investigation as to the Alleged
Existence in the County of New York of an Organized Traffic in Women for Immoral
Purposes (June 29, 191o), reprinted in 0. EDWARD JANNEY, THE WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC IN
AMERICA 56, 61 (1911) ("We have found no evidence of the existence in the County of New
York of any organization or organizations, incorporated or otherwise, engaged as such in the
traffic in women for immoral purposes, nor have we found evidence of an organized traffic
in women for immoral purposes."); see also infra Section I.C. (discussing the Dillingham
Commission's report and its acknowledgment that there seemed to be no organized white-
slave trade). Moreover, this question continues to engage historians and scholars concerned
with whether early-twentieth-century reformers identified a true problem or stiffed up an
unfounded moral panic. See, e.g., EDWARD J. BRISTOW, PROSTITUTION AND PREJUDICE: THE
JEWISH FIGHT AGAINST WHITE SLAVERY 1870-1939 (1982); MARK THOMAS CONNELLY, THE
RESPONSE TO PROSTITUTION IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1980); FREDERICK K. GRITTNER,
WHITE SLAVERY: MYTH, IDEOLOGY, AND AMERICAN LAW 4 (1990); PAMELA HAAG, CONSENT:
SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 65-74 (1999);
LANGUM, supra note 25, at 3; ROSEN, supra note 18, at 112-16. Nor is this Article about the
social history of prostitution or the varied historical approaches to prostitution reform. See,
e.g., TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SEX, 1790-1920 (1992); MARILYNN WOOD HILL, THEIR SISTERS'
KEEPERS: PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK CITY, 1830-1870 (1993); BARBARA MEIL HOBSON,
UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION
(1987); JANNEY, supra; ROSEN, supra note 18; WILLOUGHBY CYRUS WATERMAN,
PROSTITUTION AND ITS REPRESSION IN NEWYORK CITY, 1900-1931 (1932).
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about the ways in which federal laws sought to regulate a particular form of sex
in the early twentieth century by branding it immoral, and the repercussions of
those laws for the legal regulation of multiple forms of nonmarital sexuality.
Moreover, it is about how the legal regulation of prostitution merged with the
legal regulation of other forms of nonmarital sex and created a legal space for
federal judges and lawmakers to define and redefine the line between licit and
illicit sex, as well as the shifting role played by marriage in policing the licit-
illicit divide.
Legal conversations and changes, of course, shape and reflect larger
historical contexts of evolving social, political, and cultural norms. Lawmakers
added the "immoral purpose" language to federal immigration law in 1907.
The Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas almost a full century later in
2003. At multiple moments between 1907 and 2003, courts and lawmakers
grappled with the meaning of illicit sex and its relationship to marriage. At
each moment of legal intervention, the relevant judges and lawmakers
confronted particular social and legal circumstances. Married life and
nonmarital sex looked different to judges, and meant different things to them,
in the 191os than they did in the 193os, or in the 196os, or in 2003. So too did
myriad other social and legal phenomena that, no doubt, interacted with
judges' and lawmakers' views of the genus of immoral sex: for example,
constructions of gender and race, and women's rights. Thus, although at any
particular moment, judges and lawmakers clung to precedents defining the
genus of illicit sex, they simultaneously interpreted and revised them within
their particular historical context.
In Part I, I begin by analyzing the early legislative and judicial history of the
sexual immorality language of the 1907 Immigration Act, and arguing that
legal actors consistently proved unable to agree about precisely what acts fell
within the genus of immoral sex and why they did. For instance, the history of
the first "immoral purpose" case to reach the United States Supreme Court,
United States v. Bitty,30 reveals judicial disagreement about what made
prostitution fundamentally immoral, as well as what other sexual practices
were enough like prostitution to fall within the genus of illicit sex imagined by
the federal lawmakers who enacted the Immigration Act. I contend that, from
Bitty onward, although their conversations about preventing immoral sex were
filled with language about protecting women, judges and lawmakers branded
certain forms of sexual expression illicit when they thought those practices
would threaten not particular women, but rather a particular model of the
family centered on marriage. Within these discussions of immoral sex,
30. 208 U.S. 393 (19o8).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
marriage emerged not only as the antithesis of illicit sex, but as the cure for
sexual illicitness.
Marriage's curative powers surely bolstered its formidable legal status,
designating it the definitive marker of sexual licitness. But even as lawmakers
and judges hailed marriage's powers in the context of defining "immoral
purpose," they simultaneously perceived dangers to marriage inherent in the
relationship between moral and immoral sex. In Part II, I argue that within the
context of legal attacks on the white-slave trade, marriage's curative powers
paradoxically threatened to reveal the inherent fragility of marriage. Thus, I
argue that lawmakers and judges tried to check these dangers of the marriage
cure through legislation, such as the 'White-Slave Traffic Act and later
amendments to the 1907 Immigration Act. Counter to the initial jurisprudence
on the meaning of "immoral purpose," their discussions reveal that marriage
could not always cure sexual illicitness. Conversely, with its decision in Hansen
v. Haff in 1934, the Supreme Court effectively conceded that not all sex outside
of marriage carried an immoral purpose.31 In the decades after the passage of
the immoral purpose provisions, then, the ties between marriage and sexual
licitness, on the one hand, and nonmarriage and sexual illicitness, on the other
hand, had begun to fray.
In Part III, I analyze two later Supreme Court Mann Act cases and suggest
that, over time, the Act's "immoral purpose" language forced the Court to
confront the multiple potential meanings of marriage and, thus, the multiple
potential relationships among marriage, licit sex, and illicit sex. First, in
Cleveland v. United States,32 the Court brought polygamy within the reach of the
Mann Act despite the vociferous arguments offered by a Utah lawyer named
Claude T. Barnes, the only previous commentator to offer a sustained
interpretation of the meaning of "immoral purpose. '3 3 In Cleveland, the Court
rejected the argument that polygamy could not be part of the genus of
immorality because it was just a form of marriage, the core licit relationship.
Next, in Wyatt v. United States, the Court at last made explicit what judges and
lawmakers had long implied: Marriage itself, not any particular woman, was
the victim of the illicit sexual practices proscribed by the Mann Act. Marriage,
therefore, needed to be defended and, from this position of weakness and
vulnerability, could offer no curative powers.
I conclude in Part IV by returning to the contemporary regulation of
intimate behavior. I argue that through the immoral purpose provisions
31. 291 U.S. 559, 562 (1934).
32. 329 U.S. 14, 16-18 (1946).
33. CLAUDE T. BARNES, THE WHITE SLAvE ACT: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF ITS WORDS "OTHER
IMMORAL PURPOSE" (1946).
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lawmakers and judges first constructed and then dismantled an isomorphism
between marriage/nonmarriage and licit/illicit sex, and that Lawrence v. Texas
is the legacy of this process. Lawrence, in other words, is the legacy not only of
the privacy jurisprudence of Griswold v. Connecticut, but also of the sexual
morality jurisprudence of United States v. Bitty. Moreover, situating Lawrence in
this historical context highlights the relationship between the case's holding
and legal constructions of marriage. Lawrence, I argue, stands for the inversion
of the marriage cure: the recognition of a sexual relationship as licit, not in
spite of its nonmarital status, but (at least in part) because of its nonmarital
status.
I. THE GENUS OF SEXUAL IMMORALITY AND THE MARRIAGE CURE
In 1875, Congress entered the business of regulating prostitution. It did so
through immigration legislation aimed at keeping foreign prostitutes from
crossing into the United States.34 Responding, at least in large part, to the
perception that Chinese women were coming to America to work as
prostitutes," the 1875 "Page Law," as it was known after its sponsor,
Congressman Horace F. Page, addressed prostitution in two separate
provisions. First, the Act forbade "the importation into the United States of
women for the purposes of prostitution. ''36 This provision further declared
void all contracts in the service of prostitution and made it a felony knowingly
and willfully to import, cause to be imported, or hold for the purpose of
importation any woman for prostitution.37 Second, in a later provision, the Act
prohibited certain categories of people from immigrating to the United States,
including women "imported for the purposes of prostitution.
38
34. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477.
35. See COTT, supra note 22, at 136; GEORGE ANTHONY PEFFER, IF THEY DON'T BRING THEIR
WOMEN HERE: CHINESE FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION 8 (1999); Kerry Abrams,
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 641,
695-715 (2005); Todd Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands' Rights and Racial Exclusion in Chinese
Marriage Cases, 1882-1924, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 271, 291 (2002). As Peffer argues,
although more attention has been paid to the 1882 Exclusion Act, the Page Law "served as
America's central anti-Chinese legislation for seven years .... Thus, before exclusion, the
most effective legal barrier directed at Chinese immigrants focused on preventing women
from coming to the United States." PEFFER, supra, at 8.
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 3.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 5. On earlier state provisions excluding persons perceived to be undesirable, see Gerald
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993).
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In 1907, Congress amended these particular prostitution-related provisions
to broaden their reach.39 Once again, the 1907 Act responded, at least in part,
to concerns about the entry into the United States of Chinese women to be
prostitutes.4° Unlike the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which had been passed since
the Page Law, the supplemented anti-prostitution provisions of the 1907
Immigration Act were not, on their face, directed at Asians. Instead, the Act
simply prohibited "women or girls coming into the United States for the
purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose."4' Similarly, it forbade
the importation of women for prostitution or other immoral purpose. 4 Any
woman found in a house of prostitution within three years of her entry into the
United States could be deported. In addition, the revised Act made it a felony
to "keep, maintain, control, support, or harbor in any house or other place, for
the purpose of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, any alien woman
or girl, within three years after she shall have entered the United States."43
Despite the dramatic, expansive language of these amendments, lawmakers
offered little commentary on the meaning of the ambiguous "other immoral
purpose" language. A House of Representatives report on the 1907
amendments tersely and opaquely explained only that the reach of the Act was
being extended "in order effectively to prohibit undesirable practices alleged to
have grown up."' Against this backdrop of virtual legislative silence, it fell to
the Supreme Court in 1908 to interpret the scope of the "other immoral
purpose" language of the Immigration Act. In United States v. Bitty, the Court
did just that.41 In so doing, the Court nimbly demonstrated how a law about
which sexual practices would prevent people from crossing United States
borders- a law deeply intertwined with concerns about Asian immigration -
39. See Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, S 2, 34 Star. 898, 898-99. The 1875 Act was also
amended and expanded in 1891 and 1903. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 419-20 (1981). As Cott has observed, "[f]rom
the 189os through the 1920S there was hardly a session of Congress that did not debate
restriction of immigration." COTT, supra note 22, at 140.
40. See Stevens, supra note 35, at 291.
41. Immigration Act of 1907, § 2 (emphasis added).
42. Id.§ 3.
43. Id. (emphasis added). Notably, in 1907 Congress directly linked a woman's status in the
American polity to her intimate identity by legislating that an American woman who
married a foreigner took his nationality. See Cor-r, supra note 22, at 143. Lawmakers, in
other words, found multiple ways to link a woman's sexual and familial identity-both in
and out of marriage-with her status as a citizen.
44. AUGUSTUS GARDNER, IMMIGRATION OF ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES, H.R REP. No. 59-
4558, at 19 (19o6).
45- See United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401-03 (1Qo8).
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could quickly morph into a law about the role of marriage within the diverse
polity defined by those borders.
A. Concubinage and Sexual Immorality
John Bitty was arrested as soon as the ship carrying him from England
docked at New York City's harbor on August 4, 1907. Violet Sterling, a twenty-
one-year-old English woman whose ticket identified her as Betty Bitty, was
taken ashore as a witness . 6 When Bitty and Sterling were escorted off the ship,
conflicting stories confounded authorities seeking to determine the nature of
their relationship. According to James Cathon, another passenger on the
steamer, as the ship approached New York, Sterling confided to him that she
had left London with Bitty but now did not "trust herself with him ashore." 47
Sterling herself told police that she had met Bitty on a London street where she
was wandering one day. After chatting, Bitty offered her a job in his cigarette
factory. Although the job proved short-lived (because London authorities
seized the factory's goods), Sterling claimed that Bitty subsequently asked her
to escort him to America, promising her work upon their arrival. 4s Speaking
through his attorney, however, Bitty told a different story. "The girl worked
for me in London," he said. "[W]hen I started for New York she begged me
not to leave her. I engaged passage for her as my niece, as I thought that would
look better. I had taken a fatherly interest in her."49
Despite his tale of innocent, paternal concern, Bitty was arrested and
charged with violating section three of the Immigration Act of 1907, which
prohibited, among other things, "import[ing] or attempt[ing] to import, into
the United States, any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
for any other immoral purpose."5 0 No one alleged that Sterling was a
prostitute. Instead, the indictment charged that Bitty had imported Sterling for
an "immoral purpose," to wit: that "she shall live with him as his concubine.""1
Bitty demurred.5
Had Bitty violated the terms of the 1907 Immigration Act? He had certainly
entered the United States with a woman, but was he bringing her across the
46. Greek Accused by Girl; Both Arrested, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 5, 1907, at 5.
47. Employer, Not Her Uncle, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 5, 1907, at 2.
48. Girl and Her "Uncle" Held, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1907, at lO.
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
so. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899.
Sl. Transcript of Record at 4, United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908) (No. 503).
sa. See United States v. Bitty, 155 F. 938, 938 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd, 208 U.S. 393 (19o8).
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border for an immoral purpose? The language of the indictment only
complicated matters by naming his relationship as concubinage. Law
enforcement authorities clearly assumed that concubinage was an immoral
purpose within the meaning of the Act. But neither the indictment nor the text
of the Act defined what made a woman a concubine. As Bitty's case traveled
through the courts, it became clear that the meaning of concubinage and its
relationship to the Immigration Act's definition of sexual immorality - a
definition with prostitution at its core -were highly contested.
The trial court pondered these questions and dismissed the case against
Bitty. "In plain language," Judge Charles M. Hough explained, a concubine
was just a mistress. Thus, the indictment effectively charged Bitty with either
"br[inging] his mistress into the United States, or . ..br[inging] here a
woman who, so far as his desires go, shall be his mistress, if she is not
already." 3 In other words, it accused him of entering the country with a
woman, not his wife, with whom he had a real or potential sexual relationship.
The task before Judge Hough, then, was to determine whether this was a
practice enough like prostitution to locate it within the genus of immoral sex.
The case thus compelled the court to define prostitution, as well as its
relationship to concubinage.
Prostitution, Judge Hough observed, had two key components:
indiscriminate sex and monetary exchange. Borrowing from an 1846
Massachusetts case, he defined prostitution as "'[t]he act of permitting illicit
intercourse for hire-an indiscriminate intercourse, or what is deemed public
prostitution."'54 Concubinage, by contrast, referred to a marriage-like
relationship, albeit one that did not conform to the particulars of the law. A
concubine, the judge explained, citing to no authority for what he apparently
understood to be an obvious definition, "cohabit[s] with a man without
ceremonial marriage, or consent and intent good at common law.""s Marriage,
as understood by the law (evidence of diverse social practices
notwithstanding), involved neither indiscriminate sex nor financial exchange.
Thus, the court concluded, "from any point of view, historical, social, or legal, I
do not think that the mistress is near enough to the prostitute to be included by
general words in a statute directed against the latter unfortunate class." 56
Because an "immoral purpose" had to be like prostitution in order to fall within
the Immigration Act, and because concubinage entailed uncommodified,
53. Id. at 939.
54. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 93, 97 (1846)).
55. Id. at 939-40.
56. Id. at 940.
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nonmarital cohabitation, Bitty's importation of Sterling to be his concubine or
mistress did not violate the Act's restrictions. Concubines, in other words, were
different enough from prostitutes to fall outside of the genus of sexual
immorality.
Although Judge Hough presented his conclusions as the product of shared
and conventional social intuition, the very existence of the case before him-in
which the parties disputed both whether Violet Sterling was a concubine and
whether concubinage belonged in the same genus of sexual practices as
prostitution-belied his tacit assertion of general consensus. In fact, lawyers
and courts were never in agreement on the precise meaning of either
concubinage17 or prostitution. s8 On appeal before the United States Supreme
s7. In the decades before Bitty's case entered the judicial system, a number of state courts of last
appeal sought to clarify the meaning of concubinage and, in so doing, suggested that some
dissent existed within the relevant legal communities about when a woman became a
concubine. In one Missouri case, for instance, the lawyer for a man charged with taking a
girl for concubinage argued that the term "means something more than an indulgence in
one single act of sexual intercourse or cohabitation with another for the period of one single
night only." State v. Feasel, 74 Mo. 524, 525 (1881). Concubinage, the lawyer posited,
required "illicit intercourse with her for 'an indefinite or considerable length of time.'" Id.
The court, however, rejected his contention, concluding that the defendant had taken the
girl for concubinage if he had "cohabit[ed] with her as man and woman in sexual
intercourse for any length of time, even for a single night, without the authority of legal
marriage." Id.; see also Henderson v. People, 17 N.E. 68, 72 (Ill. 1888) (rejecting the
argument "that any great length of time, or long-continued illicit intercourse, is necessary to
the establishment of that relation which results in concubinage .... The relation which
gives rise to the disreputable state of woman indicated by that term may, like that of
marriage, be contracted or assumed in a day as easily as in a year."); State v. Bussey, 5o P.
891, 895 (Kan. 1897) ("When a man and woman not married agree to cohabit with each
other as though the marriage relation existed between them, without fixing any limit as to
the duration of the relation, she becomes his concubine as soon as cohabitation begins. As
the trial court stated, a long-continued illicit intercourse is not necessary to constitute the
relation of concubinage. ... ); State v. Overstreet, 23 P. 572, 574-75 (Kan. 189o) ("We
presume that the gravamen of the offense of concubinage is not simply living in the same
house together, but having intercourse with each other, as man and wife, when there has
been no legal marriage.... After one act of sexual commerce, the happiness and honor of
the girl are destroyed; her character is gone; her reputation may be ruined."); People v.
Cummons, 23 N.W. 215, 215 (Mich. 1885) (holding that the terms "concubinage" and
"prostitution" in a statute "were evidently intended to cover all cases of lewd intercourse");
People v. Bristol, 23 Mich. 118, 127 (1871) ("The word 'concubinage' has no settled common-
law meaning, and if we look at the derivation and the usage of etymologists, we shall find it
to be a comprehensive term, covering any illicit intercourse.").
58. See, e.g., Haygood v. State, 13 So. 325, 325 (A]. 1893) (overturning the defendant's conviction
for enticing a girl for prostitution where the trial court had instructed the jury that the crime
encompassed taking the girl away to have sex with another person, because, in the view of
the appellate court, prostitution entails "common, indiscriminate sexual intercourse with
men; or, at least . . sexual intercourse by others than the party who thus entices her");
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Court, Bitty's lawyers and the government waded into this ambiguous legal
territory, sparring over this very question of the relationship among marriage,
nonmarital sex, and prostitution. 9 In so doing, they quickly revealed both the
terms concubinage and prostitution, as well as the relationship between them,
as sites not of shared understanding but of social and legal dissensus.
Bitty's attorneys, eager to differentiate the prostitute from the concubine,
stressed the difference between prostitution and other forms of nonmarital sex.
The explicit exchange of money for sex, they insisted, marked that difference.
Echoing the trial court, Bitty's lawyer argued that "[t]he term 'prostitute'
necessarily implies the idea of a female who hires the use of her body for
money, whereas the term 'mistress' implies the case of one who cohabits with a
male without being married to him."6O Bitty's brief conceded that a mistress's
actions may be a form of sexual immorality. Nonetheless, his lawyer argued,
most often "a man's mistress never receives any pecuniary consideration for her
immoral acts.",6' Thus, if the question for the Court was what forms of sexual
behavior were like prostitution, the brief concluded that "[t]here is a marked
degree of difference between a prostitute and a mistress.," 62 By contrast, the
government's brief lumped together all "illicit sexual relations as immoral"
and, thus, within the reach of the 1907 Immigration Act.6' From a legal
perspective, the government argued, "no distinction in kind is drawn between
Sisemore v. State, 204 S.W. 626 (Ark. 1918) (differentiating between nonmarital sex and
prostitution, but acknowledging variations in courts' definitions); State v. Stoyell, 54 Me.
24, 27 (1866) ("A prostitute is a female given to indiscriminate lewdness for gain. In its most
general sense, prostitution is the setting one's self to sale, or of devoting to infamous
purposes what is in one's power. In its more restricted sense, it is the practice of a female
offering her body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men; the common lewdness of a
female."); State v. Brow, 15 A. 216, 216 (N.H. 1888) (rejecting as the incorrect definition of
prostitution, without further explanation, the trial court's instruction to the jury that if the
defendant had enticed away a girl "with the intent and for the purpose of maintaining and
continuing unlawful sexual relations with her, for an indefinite period, and living with her
in a condition of concubinage or criminal cohabitation, she was enticed away for purposes of
prostitution"); People ex rel. Howey v. Warden of City Prison, lOl N.E. 167 (N.Y. 1913)
(overturning the defendant's conviction for enticing a woman for prostitution because,
counter to the view of the trial court, a "single act of intercourse" cannot constitute
prostitution).
5g. See Brief for the Defendant in Error at 3-5, United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (19o8) (No.
503) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief]; Brief for the United States at 9, Bitty, 208 U.S. 393
(No. 503).
6o. Defendant's Brief, supra note 59, at 5.
61. Id.
6a. Id.
63. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 9.
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mere illicit cohabitation and prostitution. Both are immoral in the eye of the
law; if they differ, it is merely in the degree of immorality."6"
The Supreme Court embraced the government's arguments and overturned
the district court's opinion. While Judge Hough had marked both
indiscriminateness and monetary exchange as the indelible markers of
prostitution -evils definitionally absent from a relationship between a man and
his concubine or mistress -the Supreme Court offered a different account of
what located prostitution at the core of the genus of immoral sex. Prostitution,
Justice Harlan wrote, "refers to women who for hire or without hire offer their
bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men.""s The monetary
commodification of sex, then, was not necessary for a relationship to be one of
prostitution. Instead, the Court offered an alternate account of the immoral
nature of prostitutes' behavior. Prostitutes, according to the Court, threatened
the critical sociolegal institution of the marriage-based family:
The lives and example of such persons are in hostility to "the idea of the
family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one
man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure
foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent
progress in social and political improvement.""
Based on this revised interpretation of the immorality of prostitution, the
Supreme Court offered a different account of the relationship between
prostitution and other forms of nonmarital sex than the account offered by the
trial court. The Supreme Court reasoned that living in a state of concubinage
was, in fact, an immoral purpose "of the same general class or kind" as
prostitution. 67 After all, if the core harm of prostitution was the threat that it
posed to marriage, then all relationships that stood outside of marriage and
threatened its position as the sole institution for sexual intimacy fell within the
genus of sexual immorality. 68 Concubinage was a form of "illicit intercourse,
64. Id. at 12.
65. United States v. Bitty, 2o8 U.S. 393, 401 (19o8).
66. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1884)).
67. Id. at 4o2.
68. For a different account of the conflict between marriage and prostitution, see CoTT, supra
note 22, at 136-37, which argues that prostitution was presumed to be coercive, thereby
reinforcing that marriage was consensual.
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not under the sanction of a valid or legal marriage." 6' Thus, as the Court
explained:
The prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in
character than the concubine, but the latter none the less must be held
to lead an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the views that
are almost universally held in this country as to the relations which may
rightfully, from the standpoint of morality, exist between man and
woman in the matter of sexual intercourse.7"
By bringing Violet Sterling into the United States to live with him outside of
marriage, therefore, John Bitty had violated the Immigration Act of 1907.
B. The Marriage Cure
With its opinion in Bitty, the Supreme Court seized on the ambiguous
"other immoral purpose" language of the 1907 Immigration Act to mark as
illicit sexual relations that challenged the place of marriage in the social order -
that is, relationships that made visible what any social observer knew: that
marriage was not the sole model of sexual intimacy. The Court marked as illicit
the broad category of sex outside of marriage. Women who were not wives and
were in sexual relationships with men, the Court suggested, were enough like
prostitutes to fall within the legal genus of sexual immorality and, thus, the
reach of the "immoral purpose" language of the 1907 Act. John Bitty violated
the relevant provision of the immigration law because he was not married to
Violet Sterling when he brought her into the United States.
Through this explication of the immoral nature of prostitution in Bitty, the
Supreme Court constructed a rather simple, isomorphic typology: Marital sex
was licit, nonmarital sex was illicit. This scheme at once enshrined marital sex
as the sole member of the genus of licit sex and also implied that marriage
possessed a curative power that policed the illicit-licit line. If marital sex was,
by definition, moral, then to cross the illicit-licit divide a couple simply had to
marry. Had John Bitty and Violet Sterling been married, for example, Bitty
would have harbored no immoral purpose akin to prostitution when he
brought Sterling into the United States.
In this respect, the immigration law's construction of marriage and its
curative powers echoed other contexts in which marriage transformed the legal
status of sexual activities from illicit to licit. State fornication laws, for example,
69. Bitty, 208 U.S. at401.
70. Id. at 402.
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criminalized sex outside of marriage.7 Marriage rendered the very same sexual
acts licit. In fact, at the time Bitty was decided, even the criminality of forced
sex (or other forms of domestic violence) was cured by marriage. 72 Marital rape
exemptions stipulated that sex between a husband and wife was, by definition,
licit.73 Marriage, in other words, was the core legal site for licit sex. In fact,
sex-redefined as licit-was a fundamental part and an "Essential
Obligation[]" of the legal institution of marriage.7 4
Marriage, to be sure, could not cure all forms of illicit sex or their adverse
legal consequences. Some forms of illicit sex stood outside the reach of the
marriage cure because state laws prohibited certain people from marrying each
other. Thus, certain sexual partners could not avail themselves of marriage's
legally transformative powers. Family members, for instance, could not cure
the illicitness of their sexual unions through recourse to marriage. 7' Nor could
same-sex couples.76 Nor could minors. Nor could sexual unions of more than
two adults. 78 Nor could sexual unions involving an adult who was already
married to someone else. 79 Nor, in the pre-Loving v. Virginia world, could
interracial couples in states with laws prohibiting their legal unions. By
excluding them from marriage and its curative powers, the law marked these
sexual unions as indelibly illicit.
71. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4 th Cir. 1986) (discussing Virginia's
fornication law, enacted in 1819); Note, Fornication, Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77
MICH. L. REV. 252, 253 & n.1 (1978).
72. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117 (1996).
73. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1373, 1428-33 (2000).
74. Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938 (D. Mich. 1940) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 587 (1932)).
7S. On incest regulation see, for example, Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harmless
Incest: Determining the Fundamental Right To Marty of Adults Related by Affinity Without
Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 262, 273-74 (2000).
76. See, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? 59-136 (2004); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 15-
50 (1996).
77. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1O5-O8 (1985).
78. See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); see also Elizabeth F.
Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (2004).
7g. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN
AMERICA81-84 (2d ed. 1997).
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Moreover, a different type of limit on the marriage cure - albeit a very
narrow one - marked some sex as illicit despite its marital nature. As a
doctrinal matter, for example, many states' sodomy laws applied to acts of
sodomy between married couplesSo Specific sexual acts, therefore, could
render illicit even intimate acts between a husband and a wife. In fact, in the
pre-Griswold v. Connecticut era, state laws criminalizing the use of birth control
by married couples effectively rendered illicit forms of nonprocreative sex-at
least when its nonprocreative nature was marked by artificial contraceptives -
even within a marriage. These laws, however, had little practical bite. As a
practical matter, even before the development of a robust constitutional right
to marital privacy, marriage protected a couple's intimate life from legal
scrutiny.8s As the Supreme Court suggested in Bitty, if a couple availed
themselves of the marriage cure they altered their rights, not only within their
private bedroom, but also at the country's public borders.
C. The White-Slave Trade and Sexual Immorality
Far from putting to rest the many questions about the relationship among
prostitution, marriage, and other forms of nonmarital sexual intimacy, the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Bitty constituted just one voice
within an emerging conversation among federal lawmakers on this topic. This
conversation, focused on the problem of the so-called white-slave trade and the
entry of women into the United States for immoral purposes, afforded
lawmakers further opportunity to define the genus of illicit sex.
The same 1907 amendments to the 1875 Immigration Act that added the
"immoral purpose" language to the Act's original prostitution restriction
explicitly spurred this conversation among lawmakers by creating an
Immigration Commission to "make full inquiry, examination, and
investigation . . . into the subject of immigration. ",8 , Senator William P.
Dillingham of Vermont chaired the Commission that, among other projects,
so. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting a constitutional challenge,
on marital privacy grounds, to the sodomy conviction of a woman for sexual acts with her
husband and another man); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 8oo, 809 (Minn. 1966); State v.
Nelson, 271 N.W. 114, 118 (Minn. 1937); see also Sodomy, in 2 JOHN BoUviER, BOuVIER'S LAW
DICTIONARY lolo (Francis Rawle ed., 1897) ("It may be committed between two persons
both of whom consent, even between husband and wife.").
81. As the Supreme Court notes in Lawrence v. Texas, historically, "[1]aws prohibiting sodomy
do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private." 539 U.S. 558,
569 (2003); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a
challenge to Connecticut's unenforced birth control law).
82. Immigration Act of 19o7, ch. 1134, 5 39, 34 Stat. 898.
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undertook a comprehensive study of the entry of women into the United States
as part of an international sex trade."s Based on extensive investigations using
undercover agents, the Commission submitted a report to Congress on
December io, 19o9, entitled Importing Women for Immoral Purposes.s 4 Although
the title of the report clearly borrowed the "immoral purpose" language of the
1907 immigration amendments, and although the report post-dated the Bitty
opinion's interpretation of that language, the content of the report made
perfectly clear that, in this context, "immoral purposes" had a particular
meaning that was distinct from the Court's capacious understanding in Bitty.
In the context of the 19o9 report, "immoral purposes" referred not to
nonmarital relationships, or to concubinage, or even to standard forms of
prostitution. Instead, by "importing women for immoral purposes," the report
meant to invoke the particular (although, as the report unwittingly revealed,
ill-defined) phenomenon of white-slave trafficking."s
The report opened with the observation that white-slave trafficking was
"the most pitiful and the most revolting phase of the immigration question. ", 86
Yet, against this backdrop of disgust and horror, the meaning and status of
white slavery plagued the Commission. Contrary to "much talk in the
newspapers," for example, the Commission candidly revealed that it had found
no evidence of a single "great monopolistic corporation whose business it is to
import and exploit these unfortunate women.""7 Nevertheless, the Commission
found much evidence of trafficking in white women for sex, which it described
in great detail.88 These practices, the Commission argued, "ha[ve] brought into
the country evils even worse than those of prostitution."8 9 For this, the
83. This was part of a larger conversation among observers and activists about the growing
dangers and evils of white slavery. See, e.g., JANNEY, supra note 29, at 13-34.
84. See U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N, IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES: A PARTIAL
REPORT FROM THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION ON THE IMPORTATION AND HARBORING OF
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, S. Doc. No. 61-196 (19o9) [hereinafter IMPORTING
WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES].
85. Cf. GRITTNER, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that "white slavery came to mean the forced
prostitution of white women and girls by trick, narcotics, and coercion"). On the deeper
historical roots of this term, see id. at 15-57. On the indeterminacy of the term itself, see
HAAG, supra note 29, at 63. See also JANNEY, supra note 29, at 56 (reprinting the report of the
New York City grand jury on white-slave traffic and quoting the judge's charge to the grand
jury, reprinted in the grand jury's report, which identifies its subject as the "organized traffic
in women for immoral purposes, or what has come to be known as the white slave traffic").
86. IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 3.
87-. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at io.
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Commission blamed degenerating European norms, which the report targeted
as the origins of the sex trade in America. "[C]onditions of vice" in Europe, the
Commission reported, had "lowered the standard of degradation of
prostitution."9 In Europe, "[u]nnatural practices" flourished -practices that
were being exported to America through trafficking in women.91
Even as the Commission's report insisted that the white-slave trade was a
pressing problem, the report implicitly grappled with how to identify the core
immorality of the phenomenon. Much as the judges in Bitty had toiled to
identify the immoral core of prostitution in order to define its legal reach and
genus, so too did the Commission squirm and struggle to identify with
precision the proposition that it wanted to seem perfectly obvious: the basic
evil of the white-slave trade. Perhaps it was deception. Indeed, the
Commission's investigators discovered some women who had been lured into
the country under false pretenses only to find themselves prostituted. 92 Or
perhaps it was coercion: After all, this was, allegedly, a form of slavery, and
investigators found some evidence of particular women who were forced to
remain in prostitution against their will.93
The Commission itself, however, had to concede that deception and
coercion - the salacious stuff of horrific media reports - could not provide a
compelling and accurate account of the harms of white slavery. In fact, the
report stated with candor that
[t]o guard against the sensational beliefs that are becoming prevalent, it
is best to repeat that the agents of this Commission have not learned
that all or even the majority of the alien women and girls practicing
prostitution in the United States in violation of the immigration act
were forced or deceived into the life.94
Moreover, the report conceded that, given the economic conditions many of
these women faced in Europe, their importation into the United States for
prostitution potentially provided "the opportunity for higher gains, a higher
economic standard of living, an opportunity for travel, and the interest of a
new environment, and perhaps at times a hope of a real betterment of
go. Id.
91. Id. at io. On the role that images of European vice played in discussions of white slavery, see
GRITrNER, supra note 29, at 4.
9z. See IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 14-16.
93. See id. at 25.
94. Id. at 31; see also COTT, supra note 22, at 146-47 (describing investigations that revealed that
women were not deceived when brought to the United States for prostitution).
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conditions."" s In other words, many women might rationally have concluded
that they would benefit economically and, ultimately, socially from coming to
America, even as sex workers. And they may very well have been correct.
If many of the individual women involved (the alleged victims of the trade)
were not demonstrably injured through the white-slave trade, however, the
Commission nonetheless identified a fundamental harm inflicted by white
slavery. As the Commission reported:
This traffic has intensified all the evils of prostitution which, per-haps
more than any other cause, through the infection of innocent wives and
children by dissipated husbands and through the mental anguish and
moral indignation aroused by marital unfaithfulness, has done more to
ruin homes than any other single cause. 96
In other words, much as the Bitty Court explained the harm that linked the
immorality of prostitution and concubinage, one harm of the white-slave
trade-whose participants acted with another "immoral purpose" - was that it
allegedly undermined marriage and the traditional family with the married
couple at its core. Just a year after Bitty, then, the Dillingham Commission's
report reinforced a sharp dichotomy between the genus of immoral sex and the
genus of marriage. Even in the absence of coercion or deception, the
relationships within the so-called white-slave trade contravened legal notions
of sexual morality, at least in part because they threatened the institution of
marriage.
II. MARRIAGE AND IMMORAL SEX:
THE POWERS AND DANGERS OF THE MARRIAGE CURE
A. Illicit Sex as a Threat to Marriage
As lawmakers focused on abolishing the white-slave trade, their
investigations forced them to confront a more complicated relationship
between marriage and immoral sex -one in which the line between licit and
illicit sex was not always perfectly clear, and in which marriage was both
powerful and vulnerable in the face of sexual immoralities. The Dillingham
Commission's analysis of the dangers of white-slave traffic already gestured at
this more complicated relationship between marriage and immoral sex. Even as
its observations preserved marriage as the vessel for crossing the illicit-licit
9s. IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 7.
96. Id. at io.
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divide, its account of the harm of the white-slave trade simultaneously
suggested that illicit sex loomed as a threat to the core licit sexual institution of
marriage. After all, marriage might possess the legal power to cure sexual
immoralities, but-by the Commission's own account- marriages could
likewise be destroyed by the harmful and corrupting influences of sexually
immoral practices like the white-slave trade.
Marriage, in other words, was not omnipotent. The marital bond was not
always strong enough to prevent husbands from succumbing to the
temptations of immoral sex, thereby destroying their families. "[D]issipated
husbands," their reprehensible ways not reformed by marriage, could be
corrupted by the powers of illicit sex. The Dillingham Commission's report
thus painted marriage as at once powerful and fragile. On the one hand, as the
antithesis of immoral sex, marriage could expunge the illicit nature of
nonmarital practices. On the other hand, those very same practices could,
instead, prompt marital unfaithfulness and, in fact, the dissolution of marital
homes. If marriage was the potential cure for illicit sex, illicit sex was a
potential threat to marriage.
Investigations of white-slave traffic suggested not only that the influence
between the genus of moral sex and the genus of immoral sex might go in both
directions, but also that the boundary between these genera-a boundary
allegedly policed by marriage-might be less clearly defined than judges and
lawmakers wished to imagine. In the course of their efforts to identify people
entering the country for immoral purposes, immigration officials unwittingly
revealed both the fragility of the line between the genera of moral and immoral
sex, and the dangers inherent in marriage's curative powers. The Dillingham
Commission report, for example, noted how difficult it was for immigration
officials to enforce the immigration laws designed to prohibit the entry of
immoral women because inspectors had no weapons at their disposal other
than their ability to judge women at ports of entry "mainly by their appearance
and the stories they tell."97 Discerning immoral women proved to be a
surprisingly tricky business. 9s One inspector "stopped by mistake the wife of a
prominent citizen of one of our leading commercial cities .... The inspector
was judging merely by her appearance and manner.... ."" Alarmingly, then,
as they sought to define the meaning of "immoral purpose" on the ground,
97. Id. at 19.
98. Lawmakers and judges confronted this ambiguity in other settings as well. On the
indeterminacy of what patterns of behavior suggested that a woman was a wife, see Ariela
R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957
(2000).
99. IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 19.
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inspectors confronted the confusing reality that wives and prostitutes did not
necessarily look or act differently from one another. '
Worse still, the investigations reported by Dillingham's Commission
suggested that the legal line between the immoral woman and the moral wife
might be too easy to cross. Herein lay a fundamental problem rooted in the
curative power of marriage. Marriage's power to cure illicit sex constituted its
unique sociolegal position as the vehicle for crossing the illicit-licit divide. As
investigators discovered, though, if marriage was the antidote to sexual
illicitness, it was an antidote that could be easily manipulated by those in need
of its curative powers. In fact, the Dillingham Commission's report suggested
that participants in the white-slave trade fully grasped the immense power of
the marriage cure and transformed marriage -allegedly the hallowed bedrock
of the social order -into a crass tool to evade legal prosecution. Investigators
charged that, rather than face prosecution under the Immigration Act's
immoral purpose provision, couples married. In so doing, they used marriage
instrumentally to cross from the genus of immoral sex to the genus of moral
sex. Although historians have suggested that very few prostitutes actually
married men to escape deportation, many lawmakers perceived the availability
of the curative power of marriage as a vexing problem for the law enforcement
officials charged with enforcing the 1907 Immigration Act.
One detective in the New York City police department, for example,
recounted a conversation he had with a non-American woman who was
arrested for entering the United States for an immoral purpose. Mary Doe, as
he called her, was found guilty of entering for an immoral purpose and was
ordered to be deported. Authorities, however, kept her in the country to serve
as a witness in a case against a man charged with harboring prostitutes. While
she was waiting to testify, an American man-called Richard Roe in the
detective's account-married her. In so doing, he granted her American
citizenship, and she was released from legal custody to the custody of her
husband.
ioo. These inspectors were not the first people to realize that the line between wives and
prostitutes might be an uncomfortably blurry one. Before Judge Hough and Justice Harlan
sparred over the meaning of prostitution, woman's rights activists in the late nineteenth
century, critical of coverture and traditional constructions of marriage, had pointed out that
the husband-wife relationship often bore a striking resemblance to prostitution. Much like
prostitutes, these early feminists argued, wives often exchanged sex for support. Marriage,
then, was just a form of "legalized prostitution." See Hasday, supra note 73, at 1427-33. If
woman's rights activists relished the critical bite of this analogy, early-twentieth-century
immigration inspectors certainly did not. Confusing a wife for an immoral woman
undermined their authority, as well as their confidence in their mission.
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Mary candidly explained to the detective her situation:
"Don't you know what he wanted from me... ? Don't you know that
he had another girl in his house . . . and when we got there he
introduced me to her (an old prostitute named Laura) and told me she
was his wife, but that I would stay with them and that we both would
make good money by both hustling from his house?"1'
Mary then made explicit the nature of her marriage: "Of course you know," she
told the detective, "that if I married that fellow Roe, it was only to beat
deportation and be safe forever as I am now an American citizen.""1 2 This was
not the normative model of marriage that lawmakers embraced. This
relationship, after all, was not a compelling account of the genus of licit sex. In
fact, it suggested that a marital relationship could be used for illicit purposes.
The same New York City detective also recounted his conversation with a
woman he called Jane Doe, another non-American arrested for entering the
country for immoral purposes. She too was ordered deported but held to serve
as a witness in a pending case. She too married an American citizen -in this
case, an immigration official who, in her words, "got 'dead stuck' on me,
because I appeared to be a nice girl .... I know how to behave, when
necessary."" 3 Displaying her marriage certificate to the detective, Jane
explained that her new husband had moved to Texas, but she had stayed in
New York. "I couldn't live with that man," she stated. "[H]e isn't making
enough money. I don't want to go into the dressmaking business and earn $8
or $9 a week when I can make that every day on Broadway.""0 4 The detective
closed his affidavit with the observation that "[a]lmost every night I see the
said Jane Doe (now Mrs. Doe) soliciting on Broadway and taking men to
hotels in that vicinity." '° Again, then, the Commission confronted evidence
that the legal formalities of marriage did not necessarily create the enduring
families or the conventional, committed marriages that judges and lawmakers
imagined when they contrasted the genus of sexual immorality with the
morality of marriage. Perhaps marriage did not always transport an
individual's actions across the illicit-licit line.
lOi. IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 45 app. IV-B (reproducing
affidavits from a report of the New York Commissioner of Police).
102. Id.
1O3. Id. at 45.
104. Id. at 46.
105. Id. at 46.
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Moreover, as the detective's cases depicted, if marriage's curative powers
could not always expunge the immoral taint of certain sexual relationships,
marriage nonetheless retained the power of conferring citizenship. Whether or
not their motives were pure, when an American man married a foreign woman
eligible for citizenship, he made her an American citizen (who thus could not
be deported)."6 In most contexts this link between marriage and citizenship
was thought to bolster the moral foundations of the social order; marriages
and families, after all, created good citizens. ° If men were marrying immoral
women and granting them citizenship, however, the link between marriage
and citizenship created a grave threat to the social order: With the aid of
American men, the wrong women, it seemed, might become citizens.
This was certainly not an entirely novel fear. The 1855 federal statute that
had first allowed American men to pass their citizenship on to their wives had
stipulated that "any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws" could take on her husband's American citizenship. , 8 Until
Reconstruction, this meant that, because blacks could not be naturalized
citizens, black women could not become citizens through marriage.' 9 Until the
1940s, Asians could not become naturalized citizens and, thus, Asian women
could not become citizens by marrying American men."' Even though
lawmakers had long linked marriage and citizenship, they had also long
recognized that marriage should not be a route to citizenship for women
thought to be undesirable as members of the polity. As lawmakers
contemplated the immoral purpose provisions of the 1907 Immigration Act,
however, they feared that the naturalization requirements did not sufficiently
protect the polity from immoral women.
Therefore, even as the Dillingham Commission was preparing its report,
the Secretary of Commerce and Labor asked Attorney General George W.
Wickersham to issue an advisory opinion on whether marriage to an American
man (and, thus, the acquisition of United States citizenship) necessarily
1o6. See COTT, supra note 22, at 143.
107. See id. at 142-43.
1o8. Act of Feb. lo, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 1O Stat. 604, 604; Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 POL. & Soc'Y 1
(1984).
1o9. See IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 42-43 (1996).
In 1790, Congress limited naturalization to "any alien, being a free white person, who shall
have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of
two years." Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, S 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103.
11o. See Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 46o (1912); Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 496
(1868); Stevens, supra note 35, at 286-88.
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precluded the deportation of a woman who had entered the country in
violation of the 1907 Immigration Act's immoral purpose provisions. The
Attorney General advised that once a non-American woman eligible for
citizenship married an American man, she necessarily became a citizen. "Of
course," he noted, if the marriage was "entered into merely for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws and with no intention on the part of the parties
to live together as man and wife," then "a different question would be
presented..... If no fraud was involved, however, then the mere fact of a
woman's sexual immorality did not preclude her becoming a citizen. "It may be
argued with some force," Attorney General Wickersham conceded, "that
Congress could not have intended... to confer citizenship upon alien women
of immoral character, in view of the fact that the naturalization laws have
always required an applicant for citizenship to be of good moral character." 2
Acknowledging this argument, however, Wickersham clung to a strong
version of the marriage cure. Congress, he opined, could very well have
"considered the fact that a woman was married to a citizen of the United States
as indicative of her good character, whatever she may have been previous to her
marriage."'13 After all, Wickersham observed, "character is not immutable, and
while acts of prostitution are indicative of bad character, the entering of a
prostitute into the lawful state of matrimony indicates a reformation and
present good character, which it is the duty of society to encourage."
114
Marriage, in other words, cured a woman's character insofar as that character
was linked to sexual immoralities, rendering her fit to participate in the polity.
Although this view bolstered the power of marriage, law enforcement
officials, including the Commissioner-General of Immigration, nonetheless
believed it impeded their efforts to crush the white-slave trade. Pursuant to a
1904 international treaty for the repression of the trade in white women, which
the United States ratified in 1905, the Commissioner-General of Immigration
was designated the official who represented the United States in this
international effort."5 On January 31, 191o, in response to a request from the
Senate for information regarding "what action, if any, has been taken, under
the treaty ratified .. for repression of the trade in white women," President
Taft sent the Senate Committee on Immigration a report by Commissioner-
General Daniel J. Keefe pointing explicitly to the dangers of the marriage cure.
iii. Alien Woman Married to An American Citizen, 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 520 (1909).
112. Id. at 515.
113. Id. at 516.
114. Id. at 519.
115. See International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic" art. 1, May 18,
1904, 35 Star. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83.
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"One of the great difficulties encountered in the deportation of alien
prostitutes," Keefe reported, "has been the contraction of marriages to citizens
of the United States as soon as warrant proceedings have been instituted.""' 6
Or as another observer of the white-slavery phenomenon noted, "[i] n the mind
of the trafficker there is no sanctity attached to marriage.... [I]nstances are
known where men have legally married women only to force them into an
immoral life in order to collect money from them. The lax marriage laws of the
States facilitate such a proceeding .... 7
B. From International to Interstate Borders
Faced with the inability of immigration officials to enforce the 1907
Immigration Act with sufficient vigor to stamp out the perceived problem of
the white-slave trade, the Dillingham Commission recommended a series of
policy changes with respect to enforcement of the immigration laws. " ' In
addition, the Commission proposed that new laws be added to the arsenal for
the fight against white slavery. To this end, the report advised states to enact
more stringent laws against prostitution. 9 Moreover, it advised federal
lawmakers that "[t]he transportation of persons from any State, Territory, or
District to another for the purposes of prostitution should be forbidden under
heavy penalties." 20
Federal lawmakers swiftly seized upon this suggestion. On December 21,
19o9, Congressman James R. Mann of Chicago, Chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced a bill to combat
"white slave traffic." 2 Passed the next year, the Mann Act (as it would become
known) neatly bridged concerns about the movement of women across both
international and interstate borders. It proposed to criminalize a range of
behaviors that were thought to contribute to the movement of women for
white slavery. In terms of interstate borders, section two of the Act prohibited
transporting or aiding in the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce
of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
116. SUPPRESSION OF THE WHITE-SLAVE TRAFFIC: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 61-214, pt. 2, at lo (191o) (requiring each signatory to establish an
"authority who will be directed to centralize all information... [and] correspond directly"
with other signatory nations' designated authorities); see also COTT, supra note 22, at 147.
117. JANNEY, supra note 29, at 24-25; see also Stevens, supra note 35, at 292.
118. See IMPORTING WOMEN FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES, supra note 84, at 33-34.
iig. See id. at 38.
120. Id. at 36.
1z. WHITE SLAE TRAFFIC, H.R. REP. No. 61-47 (1909).
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other immoral purpose."'22 Moreover, it specifically prohibited procuring or
aiding in the procurement of any transportation tickets to be used to transport
any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce "for the purpose of
prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose."' 23 In another
section, the Act made it a felony to "knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or
coerce, or cause to be persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced, or aid or assist in
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing" any female to move in interstate or
foreign commerce "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose."1" This provision stated explicitly that such actions
were illegal regardless of whether or not the woman's consent was obtained.
Section six of the Act turned its attention away from interstate movement of
women and back to the more traditional concerns of immigration law:
"regulating and preventing the transportation in foreign commerce of alien
women and girls for purposes of prostitution and debauchery."'' 5 This
provision designated the Commissioner-General of Immigration as the official
authority to receive information on "the procuration of alien women and girls
with a view to their debauchery. ,,,6
The question of Congress's power to pass the White-Slave Traffic Act once
again pushed lawmakers to define the exact nature of the amorphous problem
of illicit sex-that is, the genus of sexual immorality. Defenders of Mann's bill
pointed to Congress's treaty power pursuant to an international agreement on
suppressing white-slave traffic as congressional authority for the provisions of
the bill regulating the entry of women into this country."7 The remainder of
the bill, however, generated substantial controversy over its constitutionality
under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.1 8 After all, the legal
regulation of prostitution was the proper province of the states - a core
example of states' police power. Thus, the introduction of the White-Slave
Traffic Act spurred lawmakers to define with precision what exactly- if not
prostitution per se -they sought to regulate through this federal law and why
they had the power to do so.
122. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, §2, 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910) (codified as





127. See WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIc, S. REP. No. 61-886, at 2 (1910).
128. See id. at 7-10.
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Mann's report to the House of Representatives attempted to distinguish
white-slave traffic from garden-variety prostitution in order to convince
lawmakers that his proposed legislation in no way interfered with the states'
traditional police powers. To this end, the opening section of Mann's report
made clear that his bill did "not endeavor to regulate, prohibit, or punish,
prostitution or the keeping of places where prostitution is indulged in." 29
Later, it further refined its focus, with every step honing in on a more precise
account of what constituted the core regulable features of white slavery. The
legislation, Mann's report stated, was "not needed or intended as an aid to the
States in the exercise of their police powers in the suppression or regulation of
immorality in general," nor was it intended to regulate "voluntary
prostitution."'30 In contrast to these practices, Mann pointed to lack of consent
as the core evil of white slavery: "The characteristic which distinguishes 'the
white-slave trade' from immorality in general is that the women who are the
victims of the traffic are unwillingly forced to practice prostitution."13' Thus,
the report stated, "[t]he term 'white slave' includes only those women and girls
who are literally slaves -those women who are owned and held as property
and chattels -whose lives are lives of involuntary servitude.' 1 32 Moreover, like
the Court in Bitty and the Dillingham report, Mann described the illicit sexual
practices in question as a threat to marriage and its place in the polity. The
report noted that the victims of the white-slave trade "are those women and
girls who, if given a fair chance, would, in all human probability, have been
good wives and mothers and useful citizens."1 3  The white-slave trade, in other
words, robbed women of the opportunity to participate in the traditional
family.
A minority report from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, however, argued that Congress had no power to pass Mann's bill.
Congressman William Richardson, author of the minority report, argued that
Congress should remain in the business of regulating immigration and leave
the regulation of prostitution to the states. 34 Moreover, defending states'
129. WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC, H.R. REP. No. 61-47, at i (19o9).
130. Id. at 9-1o.
131. Id. at lo.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 11.
134, Id. pt. 2. This debate only highlighted the fraught relationship between the Mann Act and
more traditional forms of immigration law- a debate most visible in the conflict between
Congressman Mann of the Interstate Commerce Committee and Congressman Howell of
the Immigration Committee, whose committee had the proper authority to address the
problem of white slavery. One day before Mann's committee reported out its White-Slavery
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rights on the floor of the House, Congressman Richardson opposed Mann's
bill and specifically pointed to the dangerous ambiguity of a federal law
regulating anything as ill-defined as "immoral purposes." "What is the
commerce here in this bill?" Richardson asked. He continued:
Does he say that anybody is to receive that woman? Simply the vague,
indefinite statement that she is going to start from a place in one State
and is going to another for immoral purposes. Immoral purpose? There
are a great many good and benevolent people in this country that think
that horse racing is immoral and that chicken fighting is immoral.
There are a great many people who believe that. How are you going to
define immoral purposes under this bill? They are vague and indefinite.
There is nothing tangible in such a declaration. 
13
C. Immoral Purposes Under the Mann Act
Throughout this conversation, lawmakers linked Mann's bill to the 1907
Immigration Act as enacting a single, common project-albeit with distinct
sources of congressional power. And just as the drafters of the Mann Act
borrowed the "immoral purpose" language from the 1907 Immigration Act,
Mann's opponents borrowed from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
Immigration Act to bolster their arguments, citing the 19o9 case of Keller v.
United States.136 In Keller, 37 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a
Act, Howell reported out a competing immigration bill also targeting white slavery. See
Second White Slave Bill, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 19, 19o9, at 3. Congressional debates about
Howell's proposed immigration law, which - like Mann's bill - proposed to criminalize the
interstate transportation of women for prostitution and immoral purposes, highlighted the
blurry line between immigration and domestic policies. As Congressman Bennet
acknowledged, "That provision, of course, is not strictly an immigration provision. It relates
to citizens as well as aliens. It was put in the bill in order to make the provision relating to
the deportation and punishment of people engaged in this nefarious business complete." 45
CONG. REC. 517-18 (191o).
135. 45 CONG. REc. 527 (1910). Courts too struggled with the ambiguity of the "immoral
purpose" language. See, e.g., United States v. Hobbs, 287 F. 157 (S.D. Fla. 1923) (holding
that the inclusion of "or other immoral purposes" was surplusage in an indictment under
the Mann Act); People v. Rogers, 17o N.Y.S. 825, 826 (App. Div. 1918) (interpreting a New
York law that criminalized inducing a woman for an immoral purpose and holding that
"[t]he statute has been bunglingly drawn, and if the statute cannot be interpreted to define
by a clear statement the crime intended to be specified, the statute itself can furnish no basis
for any prosecution").
136. WHITE SLAVE TRADE, H.R. REP. No. 61-47, pt. 2, at 4 (1909).
137. 213 U.S. 138 (19o9).
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provision of the 1907 Immigration Act that made it a felony to "keep, maintain,
control, support, or harbor in any house or other place, for the purpose of
prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, any alien woman or girl,
within three years after she shall have entered the United States .-. ."38 While
acknowledging that such behavior was "offensive to the moral sense," the
Court held that its regulation was solely the province of the states. 39 While
Congress, under its immigration powers, could deport a prostitute because of
her illicit sexual behavior, its constitutional power did not extend to those
whose actions furthered her illicit acts.1 40 So too, opponents of the Mann Act
reasoned, Congress could certainly regulate the entry of people into the United
States, but it lacked the power to regulate illicit sex within the country's
borders.
Despite these concerns about its constitutionality, the White-Slave Traffic
Act became law on June 25, 1910.14 ' Three years after its passage, the Supreme
Court vindicated the Act's defenders by holding the Act constitutional as a
valid exercise of congressional power. No doubt, the Court reasoned in Hoke v.
United States, the states, not the federal government, had the power to regulate
prostitution that occurred within their borders.1 42 Under its commerce power,
however, Congress had the power to regulate the movement across state
borders "of persons as well as of property." 43 Thus, just as Congress could
regulate lottery traffic across state borders -as the Court had recently held in
Champion v. Ames' 44- so too could it combat the problem not of prostitution
per se, but of "the systematic enticement to and enslavement in prostitution
and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls.
1 4
Initially, then, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Mann Act and its
differentiation between prostitution and white slavery seemed to limit the
amorphous immoral purpose language borrowed from the 1907 Immigration
Act. Hoke certainly suggested that, consistent with Mann's claims before
Congress, the White-Slave Traffic Act's language of "prostitution, debauchery,
138. Id. at 139 (quoting Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, S 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899).
139. Id. at 144.
140. See id. at 148.
141. See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24z4 (2000)).
142. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321 (1913) ("There is unquestionably a control in the
states over the morals of their citizens, and, it may be admitted, it extends to making
prostitution a crime.").
143. Id. at 320.
144. 188 U.S. 321, 353-64 (1903).
145. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 322.
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or other immoral purposes" targeted the particular problem of the trafficking
in women for sex, a problem rooted in systematic coercion.
On the same day that the Supreme Court handed down Hoke, though, it
also handed down Athanasaw v. United States, a case that, like Bitty in the
context of the Immigration Act, highlighted the judicial leeway inherent in the
Mann Act's ambiguous language and the ill-defined genus of illicit sex. Louis
Athanasaw and Mitchell Sampson were convicted of transporting Agnes
Crouch across state lines "for the purpose of debauchery.' ', 46 They had
provided transportation for Crouch to come from Georgia to work as a chorus
girl in their theater in Florida. Upon her arrival, Crouch was shocked by her
surroundings. Everyone at the theater, she recalled, was "smoking, cursing,
and using such language I couldn't eat. 1 47 Furthermore, she alleged,
Athanasaw "kissed and caressed" her and told her to "be his girl.'1 48 Crouch
expressed her fear and dismay to one of the "boys" at the theater, who called
the police on her behalf. 49
At trial, the defendants argued that the "debauchery" language of the Mann
Act could reach only behavior involving sex, which their behavior (however
unsavory to the court's palate) did not. The trial court rejected this contention.
The judge instructed the jury that "[t]he term debauchery, as used in this
statute, has an idea of sexual immorality; that is, it has the idea of a life which
will lead eventually or tends to lead to sexual immorality.""50 The question for
the jury, then, was "whether or not the influences in which this girl was
surrounded.., did not tend to induce her to give herself up to a condition of
debauchery which eventually, necessarily and naturally would lead to a course
of immorality sexually."' The jury convicted.
Faced with the defendants' challenge on appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the trial court's instructions were not given in error. The Mann Act, the
Court held, could reach the case of Agnes Crouch because, although she had
not engaged in sexual acts with the defendants, "the employment to which she
was enticed was an efficient school of debauchery of the special immorality
which .. the statute was designed to cover."" 2 No one suggested that this
school of immorality was under the aegis of the white-slave trade. Agnes
146. Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 328 (1913).
147. Id. at 329.
148. Id.
149. Id.
iso. Id. at 331.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 333.
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Crouch, however unfortunate her circumstances, was nobody's slave. Thus, in
the hands of the Supreme Court, the genus of immoral sex defined by the
White-Slave Act-like the genus of immoral sex defined by the Immigration
Act -began to expand.
And, in fact, only a few years later, the Supreme Court stretched the
borders of the genus of illicit sex, as defined by the immoral purpose language
of the Mann Act, even further in Caminetti v. United States."s3 The defendants in
Caminetti, like John Bitty, were convicted for transporting women for immoral
purposes, to wit: that the women would be their mistresses and concubines." 4
On appeal, the defendants contended that the Mann Act was only intended to
reach "'commercialized vice,' or the traffic in women for gain."' 5 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument. To say that transporting a woman to be one's
mistress or concubine was not an immoral purpose, the Court reasoned,
"would shock the common understanding of what constitutes an immoral
purpose when those terms are applied, as here, to sexual relations. ''156 With
this, the Court quoted at length from its opinion in United States v. Bitty,
interpreting not the Mann Act but the 1907 Immigration Act. Because Bitty's
definition of immoral purpose, which included concubinage, pre-dated the
Mann Act, the Court concluded, it "must be presumed to have been known to
Congress when it enacted the law here involved."' 7 Even though the Act was
tided the White-Slave Traffic Act, therefore, its language clearly included this
broader swath of immoral sexual behavior.s
In dissent, Justice McKenna rejected this broad definition of immoral
purpose. "'Immoral,"' he noted, "is a very comprehensive word. It means a
dereliction of morals. In such sense it covers every form of vice, every form of
conduct that is contrary to good order."5 9 In the context of the Mann Act,
however, it had to be limited by the purpose of the statute- to prevent white-
slave traffic. In this context, Justice McKenna argued, the phrase was limited to
"commercialized vice, [and] immoralities having a mercenary purpose. "1 6o "In
other words," he contended, "it is vice as a business at which the law is
153. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
154. On Caminetti, see LANGUM, supra note 25, at 97-118. See also EDWARD H. LEvi, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 42-47 (1949).
155. 242 U.S. at 484-85.
156. Id. at 486.
157. Id. at 488.
158. See id. at 489.
is9. Id. at 497 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
16o. Id.
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directed, using interstate commerce as a facility to procure or distribute its
victims.,,' 6 ' Finally, McKenna argued, Bity could be distinguished, as it
interpreted a statute with a broader purpose than the Mann Act- the cessation
of "the importation of foreign corruption. ' '1 62
D. Limiting the Marriage Cure
With Caminetti, the Supreme Court reinforced Bitty's holding that sex
outside of marriage constituted the genus of immoral sex. Moreover-again,
despite the presence of a dissent belying any single consensus-it reinforced
the idea that the breadth and content of the genus of illicit sex was the product
of shared social intuitions and sensibilities. As always, the implicit power of the
marriage cure underlay the Court's analysis. If the defendants in Caminetti had
only married their girlfriends, after all, they could have taken them across state
lines with no fear of legal sanctions.
As Caminetti was working its way through the courts, federal lawmakers
continued to brood over the dangers of the marriage cure in the citizenship
context- that is, they continued to question whether the line between licit and
illicit could be drawn so neatly by marriage. In particular, Attorney General
Wickersham's advisory opinion did not stop lawmakers from worrying about
the sinister powers of the marriage cure in the context of immoral women who
married American men and, thus, gained United States citizenship. Nor did the
Mann Act-although it emerged from discussions about the problems of
enforcing the Immigration Act-put a stop to their perception that crafty
practitioners of immoral practices were using marriage as a tool to avoid
prosecution or deportation. 6 3 In fact, less than a month after the Supreme
161. Id. at 498.
162. Id. at 503. Courts continued to cite Bitty in the context of interpreting the Mann Act, thereby
creating a shared jurisprudence for these different statutes. See, e.g., Burgess v. United
States, 294 F. 1002, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1924). Likewise, state courts borrowed from this federal
jurisprudence in defining what constituted an "immoral purpose" under state laws. See, e.g.,
State v. Reed, 163 P. 477, 479 (Mont. 1917).
163. See, e.g., STANLEY W. FINCH, THE WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC, S. Doc. No. 62-982, at 8 (3d Sess.
1912). Finch, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, proposed
that
[t]here should be an act of Congress authorizing a woman to testify in [a white-
slave traffic] case against her husband. This is particularly essential for the reason
that.., it is a common practice for procurers to marry their intended victims, and
it is frequently impossible to secure a conviction without the use of the testimony
of the woman or girl involved.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115-756 20o6
IMMORAL PURPOSES
Court interpreted the Mann Act in Caminetti, Congress amended the 1907
Immigration Act to check the traditional powers of the marriage cure.
The relevant provisions of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, had
been percolating through Congress for some time. On February 21, 1914, the
Secretary of Labor submitted a letter to the Senate Committee on Immigration
commenting on a proposed immigration bill amending the 1907 Immigration
Act. Among his recommendations, Secretary William B. Wilson proposed that
the following be added to the bill: "That for the purposes of this act the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes the
exclusion or deportation of which is prescribed by this act shall not invest such
female with United States citizenship."m6, "In no other one respect," Wilson
explained, "are the provisions of law regarding alien immoral women and the
trafficking in such women evaded so extensively as by the marriage of such
women to American citizens. '' 6 s Citing to this letter, the Committee on
Immigration included Wilson's language in its proposed act. Although the
Senate passed the bill on January 2, 1915, it was vetoed by President Wilson
(for reasons unrelated to the marriage provision). 66
The House returned to the bill, however, in 1916, spurring debate on the
language originally proposed by Secretary Wilson. Congressman Bennett, for
instance, questioned whether the proposed law was "proper or humane."167
Bennett's concerns reflected the persistent belief that marriage could cure the
immoral nature of people's sexual lives. "Is there no such thing," he inquired,
"as reform of a woman, or a man, either, for that matter?', 61 Moreover, he
opined, the proposed language would expose to blackmail "every alien woman
who hereafter marries an American citizen, although she may be chaste as the
driven snow, because any man or any woman who has a grudge or prejudice,
or simply desires money" could threaten to expose her as "immoral" and thus
Id. at 8. This was the problem eventually confronted by the Supreme Court in Wyatt v.
United States, 362 U.S. 525 (196o), discussed infra Section W.B.
164. WILLIAM B. WILSON, REGULATION AND RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION, S. Doc. No. 63-451,
at io (1914). The proposed language initially spurred debate among members of Congress.
Congressman Mann, for instance, argued that the language, taken seriously, suggested that
a woman could be a citizen for some purposes, for example "for the purpose of inheritance,
[or] for the purpose of protection in other respects," but not for the purpose of the act in
question. 53 CONG. REC. 5164, 5173 (1916).
165. WILSON, supra note 164, at lo.
166. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 39, at 163.
167. 53 CONG. REC. 5164,5173 (1916).
168. Id.
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deprive her of her citizenship. 69 Bennett noted that his concern was
heightened because, in his view, the proposed legislation addressed a very
small problem. Counter to the dominant political rhetoric around this issue,
Bennett observed that, when he was involved in immigration investigations,
"we were never able to find but two authentic cases where a known certain
prostitute gained American citizenship by marriage to an American citizen."17
Congressman Burnett, however, disagreed. "I am informed," he countered,
"that it is a matter of frequent occurrence that whenever they go after a woman
of that character the woman gets behind some pimp or procurer and he himself
marries the woman or gets some one else to do it.""'
Ultimately, a compromise was reached, which provided
[t]hat the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually
immoral classes the exclusion or deportation of which is prescribed by
this Act shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if
the marriage of such an alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest
or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation
under this Act.
172
The 1917 Act passed over President Wilson's veto (motivated by his opposition
to the bill's literacy test). The amendments on marriage and citizenship
inscribed within federal law a powerful check on marriage's generally capacious
curative powers.1 73 Moreover, some years after its passage, the 1917
Immigration Act, which incorporated the 1907 Act's immoral purpose
provision, gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to redefine dramatically
the genus of illicit sex.
E. Limiting Immoral Purposes
In the fall of 1931, Inger Hansen, a Danish woman, was charged with
entering the United States for an immoral purpose in violation of the 1917
(and, before it, the 1907) Immigration Act. Hansen had first come to America
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 5173-74.
172. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 889 (repealed 1952).
173. See CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIoNALIY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 40 (1998); CoTr, supra note 22, at 148; HUTCHINSON, supra note
39, at 167.
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in 1922 when she moved to Los Angeles to work as a domestic servant. 74 In
1925, she began having "illicit relations" with a married man. In 1931, they
traveled together to Europe, continuing their "illicit relations" and traveling
"for at least part of the time, as husband and wife.' ' 7 Upon their return,
suspicious immigration inspectors in Seattle questioned Hansen and she
"admitted her previous illicit relations. "1176 She claimed that "she intended to
continue such relations with him until they reached Los Angeles," but not
thereafter.' 77 Hansen was ordered deported for entering the United States for
an immoral purpose.
After her petition for habeas corpus was denied, Hansen appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, claiming that she had not entered the United States for an
immoral purpose. In particular, no doubt in an effort to distinguish her fate
from that of Violet Sterling before her, Hansen insisted that she was not a
concubine. Twenty-three years after the Court's decision in Bitty, Hansen
sought to refine the definition of concubinage and, thus, the relationship
between nonmarital sex and the genus of illicit sex. Concubinage, she claimed,
required "unlawful cohabitation, as distinguished from clandestine and
sporadic intercourse.'
178
The Ninth Circuit rejected Hansen's argument. In enacting the "immoral
purpose" provision of the immigration statute, the court opined quoting Bitty,
"'Congress had reference to the views commonly entertained among the people
of the United States as to what is moral or immoral in the relations between
man and woman in the matter of such intercourse.' 179 Thus, the court
concluded that, whether or not Hansen - like Violet Sterling - had assumed the
particular status of concubine, "at the time she entered the United States she
did so for an immoral purpose: To continue her illicit relations. '',8o
Even as the Ninth Circuit clung to the notion of a "commonly entertained"
social consensus on views of licit and illicit sex, however, any claim to such
general agreement was once again immediately undermined- this time by a
dissent from the Ninth Circuit's opinion that invoked its own vision of
"common understanding[s]" of licit and illicit sex1 To fall within the statute,




178. Id. at 95.
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Bitty, 2o8 U.S. 393, 402 (19o8)).
18o. Id.
18. Id. (Mack, J., dissenting).
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the dissent chided the court, Hansen's immoral purpose had to be within the
same genus of sexual immorality as prostitution. Hansen's actions, however,
could not be placed within that genus: "[W]hile the concubine and the
mistress are comparable to the prostitute, common understanding draws the
line too sharply between those classes and the class which indulges
occasionally in extramarital relations ....,, In the dissent's view, in other
words, occasional ventures in nonmarital (or even, perhaps more shocking,
extramarital) sex were not akin to prostitution in the collective imagination of
society. Moreover, the dissent argued, even if Hansen's sexual actions were
immoral, the sexual relations in question were not the "dominant... cause or
purpose of her return," and it could not have been Congress's intention to
deport someone "because in returning to her residence, there to follow her
legitimate and gainful occupation, the alien may have expected to indulge in
extramarital relations en route or occasionally thereafter.'
8
,
Further belying the Ninth Circuit's confident intuition about the line
between licit and illicit sex, the Supreme Court reversed on appeal, embracing
the logic of the dissent below. In a stunningly under-reasoned opinion, the
Court concluded that Hansen had not entered the country for an immoral
purpose. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the Court stated, referencing
Bitty, "extra-marital relations, short of concubinage" - that is, relations like
those between Hansen and her lover84 -did not fall within the genus of
immoral sex akin to prostitution.' The Court offered no support in logic or
precedent for this quite surprising and narrow definition of the genus of illicit
sex. Moreover, citing to lower court opinions interpreting the Mann Act, the
Court held that, with respect to the immoral purpose provision of the
Immigration Act, "[i]f the purpose of the journey is not sexual intercourse,
though that be contemplated, the statute is not violated."' 86 In the case of
Hansen, the opinion concluded, "we think it plain that in no proper sense
may the entry ...be said to have been for the purpose of immoral sexual
relations.187
While nominally following Bitty, then, the Supreme Court in Hansen
actually repudiated the central logic of its earlier opinion -that marital sex was
182. Id. at 95-96.
183. Id. at 96.
184. The dissent disputed this on the facts of the case. See Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 563-64
(1934) (Butler, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 563.
187. Id.
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moral and nonmarital sex was immoral. Hansen thus signaled a more
complicated set of legal relationships among marriage, nonmarital sex, and the
genus of illicit sex, as well as, no doubt, a new set of larger legal, social,
political, and cultural contexts for these phenomena. The period between Bitty
and Hansen, after all, witnessed dramatic changes to the American polity in
multiple areas that inevitably influenced public understandings of sexual
norms and behavior. The First World War not only altered the realm of
international relations, but also emboldened suffrage activists and engaged sex
reformers.' ss The passage of the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised women
and also redefined the relationship among wives, families, and the federal
government. Sexual mores also changed markedly in the 192os, "encourag[ing]
acceptance of the modern idea that sexual expression was of overarching
importance to individual happiness.' 9 Simultaneously, growing numbers of
women -especially married women- entered the workforce, actively
eschewing the public-private dichotomy of a separate-spheres world.' 9°
It is not entirely surprising then that the legal meanings of licit and illicit
sex shifted over the course of the first decades of the twentieth century. In
rejecting the clear line between licit and illicit sex drawn in Bitty, Hansen
dramatically redefined the genus of illicit sex in a manner that reflected and
bolstered the shifting norms of the second quarter of the twentieth century -
norms that made possible a more attenuated link between nonmarital sex and
immoral sex.
Even against this backdrop of social change, the Supreme Court's opinion
exudes a distinctly modern quality. After Hansen, although nonmarital sex still
signaled illicitness, sex outside marriage (indeed, even sex in violation of a
marriage) could fall within the genus of licit sex if it was sporadic or an
occasional indulgence as opposed to concubinage-like in its duration and
consistency. Gone were the days of Bitty's simple genera of licit sex as marital
sex and illicit sex as nonmarital sex. Hansen ushered in a doctrinal regime in
which some nonmarital sex could fall within the genus of moral sex-even
without the powers of the marriage cure."" Notably, even after Hansen,
188. See, e.g., NANCY F. CoTr, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 59-60 (1987); D'EMiLIo &
FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 212-13.
189. D'EMiLIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 235.
19o. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 229 (1982) ("In 1920, less than two million of the eight million wage-
earning women were married. By 1930, more than three million of the ten million women
who worked for wages were living with husbands ... an increase of more than 25 percent.").
191. On the perceived dangers to marriage of "acting married," see Dubler, supra note 98, at
1006-09. I discuss this aspect of Hansen in Part IV.
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concubinage still fell within the genus of immoral sex. The Court did not
explicitly define concubinage. It simply differentiated between concubinage
and "extra-marital relations, short of concubinage." 92 Seemingly, then, in a
post-Hansen world, the genus of immoral sex included long-term nonmarital
sex but not less permanent or committed forms of nonmarital sex. In other
words, sex outside marriage that resembled marriage in its duration and
commitment was more akin to prostitution than nonmarital sex that eschewed
any of the conventional trappings of marriage. The Court gave no explanation
for this judgment- grounded perhaps less in a comprehensive theory of sexual
regulation than in a desire to avoid repudiating Bitty. Its holding, however,
gestured at the potentially threatening nature of relationships that resembled
marriage without marriage's legal imprimatur.
III. MODERNIZING THE GENUS:
THE PLURAL MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE AND IMMORAL PURPOSE
Let's return to where this Article began: considering the question of what
links disparate sexualized practices. As a variation on Justice Scalia's list in
Lawrence v. Texas, ask yourself what common features unite the following
practices: female nudity, beastiality, tribadism, pederasty, irrumation,
flagellation, masochism, sadism, mixoscopia, frottage, and cunnilingus. Like
Justice Scalia's list, this list-authored by Claude T. Barnes in 1946' 93- features
a broad range of sexualized practices that appeal to different people. Moreover,
like the practices listed by Justice Scalia, these practices evoke different social
meanings and cultural markers. Once again, however, the law bonds these
diverse practices into an intelligible category. Like the practices listed by Justice
Scalia many years later, Barnes's list consists of sexualized practices that the
law has traditionally frowned upon. And, as Justice Scalia would do many years
later, Barnes crafted this list as an account of the content of the legal category
of illicit sex. In constructing his list, however, Barnes's motives were quite
different from those of Justice Scalia. In fact, he sought to establish that the
genus of illicit sex excluded a practice that, decades later, Justice Scalia would
confidently declare illicit: polygamy.
192. Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562.
193. BARNES, supra note 33, at 31.
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A. United States v. Cleveland
Claude T. Barnes was born in 1884 to a Mormon family in Kaysville, Utah,
the eighth child of his father's third wife.'94 He trained as a lawyer at both the
University of Chicago and the University of Michigan, but his true passions
were nature and the natural sciences, subjects on which he published
extensively throughout his legal career.19 In the early 1940s, he was hired to
defend a group of polygamous men-adherents to the "original doctrines of
the Mormon Church"' 96 -who had been charged with violating the Mann Act
by transporting their plural wives across state borders. In so doing, their
indictments charged, they transported these women for an immoral purpose -
that is, polygamy." 7
His clients were convicted, and, after losing in the Tenth Circuit, Barnes
appealed his case to the Supreme Court. In his brief before the Supreme Court,
Barnes and his co-counsel sought to convince the Court (once again) that
interpreting the "immoral purpose" language of the Mann Act to cover his
clients' actions would render the Act's provision unconstitutional as an
infringement on the traditional state police powers, and also that his clients'
actions could be distinguished from truly immoral sexual practices - those
practices that were akin to prostitution, not marriage. Under the principle of
ejusdem generis, the brief argued, polygamy could not be a part of the genus of
immoral sex. The genus of sexual immorality, after all, could not include
"voluntary, natural motherhood. " "19 Turning to scientific sources, the brief
posited that the genus was composed of a "host of sexual perversions and
unnatural practices" such as those chronicled in Dr. R. V. Krafft-Ebing's
medical treatise, Psychopathia Sexualis.'99 Certainly, the petitioners' lawyers
argued, it would be "tragic" if the legal definition of sexual immorality could
apply to "these lowly people with their humble homes and healthy
children."' ° These people, in fact, clung to traditional notions of sexual
morality. For example, the brief pointedly recounted, one of the petitioners had
"await[ed] the performance of a 'celestial marriage' before sexual relations were
194. See Davis Bitton, Claude T. Barnes, Utah Naturalist, 49 UTAH HIST. Qz316, 318 (1981).
195. Id. at 321-24.
196. Brief of Petitioners at 6, Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (Nos. 12-19). In the
late nineteenth century, the Mormon Church had formally renounced the practice of
polygamy. See GORDON, supra note 78, at 234.
197. See United States v. Cleveland, 56 F. Supp. 890 (D. Utah 1944), affid, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
198. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 196, at 25.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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indulged" with his wife.2"' With this example of foregone premarital sex, the
brief brilliantly gestured at its key argument: Practitioners of plural marriage
believed in the traditional boundary between the genus of licit and the genus of
illicit sex, as well as the full powers of the marriage cure. Polygamy, in other
words, should rightly be part of the genus of moral sex, not its antithesis.
Barnes argued his case before the Supreme Court in October 1945. At the
time of his argument, Justice Jackson was away at Nuremberg, so the Court
requested that Barnes reargue the case upon Jackson's return.Y02 Based on his
experience in the initial argument, Barnes realized that the meaning of
"immoral purpose" was ripe for further study. In the time between his
arguments, therefore, he conducted a "thorough investigation" into the history
and meaning of the "other immoral purpose" language of the Mann Act. 3 The
Sugar House Press in Salt Lake City published the fruits of his research as a
pamphlet.
Barnes's scientific proclivities melded perfecdy with the science-like
foundations of the ejusdem generis principle. Ever the naturalist, Barnes crafted
a careful legal analysis of the relationship between polygamy and "immoral
purposes" under the Mann Act and, in particular, of the elements of the genus
of immoral sex. Barnes's basic argument, bolstered by diagrams of various
genera, was quite simple: Polygamy could not be an "immoral purpose"
because it was a form of marriage." 4 By "immoral purposes," Barnes observed,
lawmakers intended to include practices that "belong to the genus
prostitution" - that is, "the exhibition of women in the nude, or in sexual
concourse with animals, and sexual perversions such as tribadism, pederasty,
irrumation, flagellation, masochism, sadism, mixoscopia, frottage and
cunnilinguism. '20 Moreover, Barnes continued, engaging Judge Hough and
the Supreme Court's opinion in Bitty as he expanded his typology, "[a]
mistress is a private prostitute; a concubine is a secondary wife. "26 He quickly
explained the distinction by adverting to conventional understandings of the
2o. Id. at 13.
zoz. See BARNES, supra note 33, at 5.
203. Id.
204. In this respect, Barnes's diagrams provide an instructive comparison with those drawn some
decades later by Gayle Rubin. Despite their different ideological perspectives, both Barnes
and Rubin offer schematic views of marriage's sociolegal powers to define sexual licitness
and, thus, to marginalize alternate models of sex and intimacy. See Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking
Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 3, 13 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
205. BARNES, supra note 33, at 31.
206 Id.
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family: "The first [the mistress] despises children; the second [the concubine]
lives for them. The first seeks luxury and ease; the other lives for faithfulness,
virtue, children and a home. They represent, in fact, the basic difference
between prostitution and marriage; pleasure for a consideration and
domesticity with children."20
7
Having located the concubine in the "category marriage" and the mistress
in the "genus 'prostitution,"' Barnes insisted that polygamy rightfully had to
exist within "the genus marriage. "'O° After all, if marriage was the core of the
genus of moral sex, polygamy was just more of that morality. To support his
point, Barnes, ever the good natural scientist, endeavored to map out the
respective genera. Just as a bear, of the genus ursus, and a skunk, of the genus
mephitis, should not be confused although they both belong to the order
carnivora, he argued, so too marriage and prostitution should not be confused
even though they both belong to the order "use of sex."' 09 With this, Barnes at
last diagramed in full the order of "use of sex," with its distinct genera: genus
"marriage" and genus "prostitution." The genus "marriage" was composed of
the following elements: marriage, monogamy, polygamy, wife, wives,
husband, children, home, love, sacrifice, concubine (in the sense of wife),
wedlock, matrimony, wedding, nuptials, partner, spouse, helpmate.1 0 By
contrast, the genus "prostitution" was composed of:
prostitution, carnality, debauchery, harlotry, libertinage, lubricity,
wenching, whoredom, concubinage (in the sense of mistress),
debauchee, trollop, phyrne, slut, street-walker, strumpet, trull, cyprian,
courtezan, adulteress, bawd, jade, jezebel, delilah, bitch, aspasia,
conciliatrix, bona roba, chere amie, whore, lorette, mackerell, mistress,
procuress, punk, quean, rig, satyr, whore-monger, badnio, badhouse,
brothel, bawdy house."'
All forms of marriage including polygamy, in other words, inhabited a genus of
moral sex, not a genus of immoral sex.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court, following its 1878 decision in
Reynolds v. United States, rejected Barnes's meticulous categorization, as well as
his argument that Caminetti interpreted the Mann Act too broadly. If, in many
ways, the social and legal meanings of marriage and life outside of marriage
207. Id. at 31-32.
208. Id. at 34-36.
209. Id. at 46.
210. Id. at 47.
211. Id.
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had shifted from 1878 to 1946, the Court found none of the changes relevant to
the case before it. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas began with Bitty.
"Because of the similarity of the language" in the Immigration Act and the
Mann Act, Douglas observed, Bitty had become "a forceful precedent for the
construction of the Mann Act."212 Moreover, the Court noted, in defining the
genus of sexual immorality, the Act prohibited transporting a woman across
state lines for "prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose."
Even if"[p]rostitution, to be sure, normally suggests sexual relations for hire,"
the Court noted, "debauchery ha[d] no such implied limitation." '213 Caminetti,
then, remained good law: "[T]he Act, while primarily aimed at the use of
interstate commerce for the purposes of commercialized sex, [wa]s not
restricted to that end. '2 14
In light of the scope of the genus of immorality, the Court concluded,
polygamy was surely not excluded. Such practices had "long been outlawed in
our society," and "[t]he establishment or maintenance of polygamous
households is a notorious example of promiscuity." ''1 Though polygamous
practices "have different ramifications, they are in the same genus as the other
immoral practices covered by the Act. ' '2"6 Only one form of marriage-
monogamous marriage- defined what forms of sexual conduct fell within the
genus of moral sex.
Though it did not carry the day, Barnes's work did find its way to Justice
Murphy's dissent in Cleveland, albeit not by name. Murphy bemoaned the
Court's extension of its jurisprudence applying the Mann Act to "individuals
whose actions have none of the earmarks of white slavery."2 '7 Moreover,
Murphy proposed a robust genus of marriage-robust enough to include
polygamy, even if it was not "morally the equivalent of monogamy. "2 ' In fact,
according to Murphy, there were four types of marriage: "(1) monogamy; (2)
polygyny, or one man with several wives; (3) polyandry, or one woman with
several husbands; and (4) group marriage."2 9 Even if "the contemporary
world condemn[s] the practice [of polygamy] as immoral and substitute[s]
monogamy in its place," the dissent argued, "marriage, even when it occurs in
212. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1946).
213. Id. at 17.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Id. at 18-19.
216. Id. at 19.
217. Id. at 25 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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a form of which we disapprove, is not to be compared with prostitution or
debauchery or other immoralities of that character."220 If only in dissent, then,
Cleveland highlighted the multiple potential meanings of marriage and the
possibility that particular forms of intimacy -such as polygamy -could inhabit
an ambiguous space between the genera of moral and immoral sex.
B. Wyatt v. United States
Although Justice Murphy's arguments only appeared in dissent, their
publication nonetheless suggested (once again) the absence of uniform social
or legal consensus on either the meaning of marriage or the content of the
genus of sexual illicitness. Once again, this both reflected and reinforced larger
sociocultural changes: Although the legal status of polygamy did not inspire
widespread social agitation, the visibility of diverse views on acceptable forms
of intimacy and sex increased following the Second World War. 1 From its
inception, the Mann Act had forced judges and lawmakers to confront the
complexities inherent in the categories that they wished to consider simple:
marriage and sexual immorality. Although the Supreme Court was not ready to
embrace the pluralistic vision of marriage offered (in slightly different forms)
by Claude T. Barnes and Justice Murphy, a 1960 case on the Mann Act forced
the Court to acknowledge, as a matter of doctrine, both the limits of the
marriage cure and the multiple meanings of marriage.
In Wyatt v. United States, the Supreme Court faced the same dangerous
underside to the marriage cure that Congress had confronted when it passed
the 1917 amendments to the 1907 Immigration Act: the instrumental use of
22o. Id. at 26. Murphy also denounced the Court's reliance on Bitty. He argued that the "immoral
purpose" language in the 1907 Immigration Act could not have referred to polygamy
because there was a separate provision of the Act that explicitly excluded polygamists. Thus,
he concluded, if the Immigration Act "or the interpretation given it in the Bitty case, is to be
any authority here, the conclusion to be drawn is inconsistent with the result reached by the
Court today." Id. at 27.
Murphy was critical of the expansion of the reach of the Mann Act. Just the year before
Cleveland, he dissented from a per curiam opinion holding that the Mann Act applied to
defendants who transported a woman only within the District of Columbia. See United
States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 196 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Murphy chastised his
colleagues for forgetting that "[w]e are dealing here with a statute known and referred to by
Congress ... as the 'White-slave traffic Act.'... The Congressional debates and committee
reports on the legislation make it plain that the Act was designed and intended solely to
prevent 'white-slave' traffic ...... Id. It was not intended to apply to "voluntary
prostitution." Id. at 199. On Justice Murphy, see SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE
WASHINGTON YEARS (1984).
221. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 261-74.
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marriage by individuals seeking to avoid legal penalties. James Ivey Wyatt was
indicted under the Mann Act for transporting Mary Kathleen Byrd across state
lines for the purposes of prostitution.222 After the indictment, Wyatt and Byrd
married."' At trial, when Byrd was ordered to testify on behalf of the
prosecution, both she and Wyatt objected, claiming marital privilege.2 4 Wyatt
was convicted and appealed on the ground that Byrd's testimony was admitted
in error; she was, after all, his wife.
Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan affirmed Wyatt's conviction. Harlan's
opinion at last makes plain what judges and lawmakers had long suggested in
the context of interpreting and crafting the immoral purpose provisions:
Marriage, not individual women, needed to be protected from the amorphous
threat of illicit sexual practices. It "cannot be seriously argued," Harlan opined,
"that one who has committed this 'shameless offense against wifehood,' should
be permitted to prevent his wife from testifying to the crime by invoking an
interest founded on the marital relation or the desire of the law to protect it., 2 5
"Wifehood," then, not Byrd, was Wyatt's victim. And Harlan made his claim
yet more specific: "Where a man has prostituted his own wife," he wrote, "he
has committed an offense against both her and the marital relation. ,226
Wives could be prostituted, and their formal status within marriage did not
cure the prostitution. Marriage, as the victim, could not cure the immorality at
the core of Wyatt's actions. Quite the contrary: Marriage could be threatened
and weakened by its contact with powerful immoral sexual practices. By 1960,
in other words, the Supreme Court had explicitly used the immoral purpose
language of the Mann Act to construct marriage as at once capable of offering
people a powerful curative power but, simultaneously, capable of being
victimized by people's illicit sexual relations. As in Cleveland, the Court's
opinion in Wyatt reinforced that simply marrying did not guarantee entry into
the privileged genus of moral sex.
IV. ILLICIT SEX AND THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
The immoral purpose provisions of the 1907 Immigration Act and the 191o
Mann Act are not the most obvious historical antecedents of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas. Doctrinally, Lawrence overturned Bowers
222. Wyatt v. United States, 263 F.2d 304, 305 (5th Cir. 1959), affd 362 U.S. 525 (196o).
223. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526 (196o).
224 Wyatt, 263 F.2d at 308.
225. Wyatt, 362 U.S. at 527 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 529.
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v. Hardwick, not United States v. Bitty. Lawrence is generally understood as a
case about the particular rights of same-sex couples, couples who were
definitively neither the intended nor the unintended targets of the immoral
purpose provisions of the 1907 and 191o Acts. Moreover, as a matter of
constitutional law, the history of the immoral purpose provisions illuminates
Congress's power-its immigration power and commerce clause power,
respectively-to pass legislation regulating certain forms of sexual behavior.
Through interpreting these statutes, then, the Supreme Court defined a sphere
of constitutionally regulable sexual conduct. In contrast, by repudiating Bowers,
Lawrence defined not a sphere of regulable conduct, but rather a sphere of
intimate activity that is, as a matter of substantive due process, beyond the
reach of state regulation.
But Lawrence does more than place same-sex sodomy outside the reach of
state criminal law. In protecting the rights of individuals to engage in same-sex
sex, Lawrence definitively unmakes the isomorphism between nonmarriage-
illicit sex and marriage-licit sex. After all, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron
Garner were not married, nor could they have married within the United
States. Nonetheless, the Court recognized their sexual union as entitled to
constitutional protection. And it did so in an opinion whose prose signals not a
grudging extension of constitutional protection to a particular erotic act, but
rather a recognition of the licitness of a particular form of sexual intimacy.
Justice Kennedy's opinion, after all, criticizes Bowers v. Hardwick for, among
other things, misunderstanding "the extent of the liberty at stake"22 7 in cases
involving same-sex sodomy. According to Lawrence, "[t]o say that the issue in
Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. "228 Instead, the opinion notes, the Constitution protects the right
of any person to engage in "intimate conduct with another person" that "can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring."2" 9 No doubt, one
can dispute whether or not Lawrence and Garner in fact understood their
sexual encounter as part of an enduring personal bond. Whether or not his
analysis fit the facts before him, though, Justice Kennedy's language, complete
with a comparison to marriage, casts a patina of licitness on the sexual practices
in question. In this respect, Lawrence marks the final repudiation of the core
logic of Bitty -that licit sex had to occur within marriage and all sex outside of
27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
28. Id.
22g. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
marriage fell within the genus of illicit sex-just as surely as it marks the
doctrinal rejection of Bowers.
Of course, before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence, the links between
marriage and licit sex, and nonmarriage and illicit sex, had already
substantially frayed in multiple legal contexts. On the marriage-licit side of the
typology, for example, the widespread repudiation of marital rape exemptions
had eroded the historical power of marriage to render licit sexual acts that
would have been illicit between unmarried partners.23° On the nonmarriage-
illicit side, decades before Lawrence, courts began granting to unmarried
couples reciprocal rights that had previously been granted only within marital
relationships. In a post-Marvin v. Marvin era of palimony and contracts for
cohabitation, sex outside marriage could no longer be labeled illicit in any
simple sense.231
Likewise, internal to the constitutional jurisprudence of privacy, the
isomorphism between marriage-licit sex and nonmarriage-illicit sex had
unquestionably already begun to come undone before the Supreme Court
decided Lawrence. In particular, the move from Griswold v. Connecticut23 to
Eisenstadt v. Baird13' dealt a powerful blow to any legal claim to an indelible
bond between nonmarital sex and sexual illicitness. Once the right to privacy
extended beyond nonprocreative sex within the "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms," to encompass the sexual choices of unmarried individuals, the
status of sex outside of marriage clearly had begun its migration over the illicit-
licit divide. 34 Thus, within this doctrinal context, Nan Hunter has argued that
Lawrence "tied up the loose ends of th[e] project" of the "delinking of sex and
marriage" begun by Eisenstadt and Griswold.2 35
230. On the contemporary place of marital rape exemptions, see Hasday, supra note 73, at
1482-98. 1 certainly do not mean to suggest that marriage never functions as a cure today.
The Kansas Court of Appeals, for instance, recently pointed out that "[g]enerally, sex acts,
including sodomy, between a child and an adult are illegal, unless the child is married to the
adult when the sex acts occurred." State v. Limon, 83 P. 3d 229, 235 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004),
rev'd No. 85,898, 2005 Kan. LEXIS 715 (Oct. 21, 2005).
231. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d io6, 1O9 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing a right to palimony because
"[d]uring the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the number of couples
living together without marrying").
232. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
233. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
234. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
235. Hunter, supra note 19, at 1112. Hunter argues that "Lawrence removes the last obstacle to the
paradigm of consent, rather than the institution of matrimony, controlling the definition of
when sex is presumptively legal." Id.
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Insofar as Lawrence further untethers any exclusive link between licit sex
and marriage, however, it is the legal-though not the narrowly doctrinal-
legacy not only of Eisenstadt v. Baird, but also of Hansen v. Haff and subsequent
cases interpreting United States v. Bitty and the federal immoral purpose
provisions. Reading Lawrence in this latter, less traditional, context points to
the ways in which marriage still exists in a peculiar relationship to the
redefined categories of sexual licitness and illicitness. To be sure, gone are the
days of Bitty when marital sex constituted the entirety of the genus of licit sex
and nonmarital sex, akin to prostitution in its disregard for marriage's place at
the top of the hierarchy of intimate relations, constituted the genus of illicit
sex. But marriage still plays a role in policing a licit-illicit line.
Recall Justice Kennedy's opinion. On the one hand, the opinion compared
Lawrence and Garner to a married couple by way of explaining why their
relationship was entitled to constitutional protection: Just as marriage is about
more than sex, so too are relationships between same-sex partners.36 In this
respect, the Court drew upon marriage's traditional abilities to signal sexual
licitness. But this is not the only role that marriage plays in Lawrence. Recall
too the opinion's brief meditation on the nature of the relationship between
Lawrence and Garner and its contrast with various forms of illicit sexual
relations. Their relationship was licit, at least in part, because it did not involve
acts of sex in public, prostitution or "whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." '37 In
other words, it was not a marriage in form or function.
In this respect, then, Lawrence turns the marriage cure on its head.
Marriage, after all, has generally been the vehicle for moving a relationship
from the genus of illicit sex into the genus of licit sex. Think back to John Bitty
and Violet Sterling: Had they been married, Bitty could never have been
charged with bringing Sterling into the country for an immoral purpose
because their marriage would have located their relations squarely within the
genus of licit sex. Likewise, the unmarried adults seeking to obtain
contraceptives in Eisenstadt could have married and brought themselves within
the logic of Griswold. In contrast, by explicitly pointing to its nonmarital
nature, Lawrence suggests that the relationship between John Geddes Lawrence
and Tyron Garner was licit and entitled to constitutional protection at least in
part because it made no claim to being a marriage. 38 Of course, Lawrence and
236. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
237. Id. at 578.
238. In the context of the legal regulation of interracial sexual relationships, nonmarital
interracial sex gained some measure of constitutional protection before marital interracial
sex did. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
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Garner could not have been prosecuted for attempting to marry (as John Bitty
was prosecuted for his relationship with Violet Sterling). Although their
attempts to marry would not have been illicit in that sense, their choice to
eschew claims to legal marriage nonetheless played a part in the Court's
construction of the licitness of their union. Justice Kennedy's analysis suggests
that Lawrence and Garner's relationship was licit not in spite of its nonmarital
status but, rather, at least in part, because of its nonmarital status.
With Lawrence, the Court did more than simply delink sex and marriage in
a continuation of the project it began with Eisenstadt. The Court also completed
the project it began with Hansen v. Haff, granting licit status to nonmarital
sexual relationships that could not become legal marriages precisely because
the relationships in question existed outside of the framework of marriage and
made no claim to the sociolegal trappings of marriage. 39 Like Lawrence and
Garner, Inger Hansen and her lover could not have availed themselves of the
marriage cure as a route to sexual licitness. Hansen's lover was already married,
and their marriage would have run afoul of the monogamy requirement just as
surely as Lawrence and Garner's marriage would have run afoul of the cross-
sex requirement. Moreover, the Supreme Court deemed the love affair between
Hansen and her lover outside the reach of the immoral purpose provision of
the Immigration Act precisely because it was not concubinage -that is, it did
not present itself as marriage-like. Through different bodies of law, therefore,
the Supreme Court recognized each relationship as licit precisely because it
differed from marriage in its manifestations -Hansen's relationship was
sporadic and clandestine, Lawrence's relationship was "private." Because of
their nature, marriage could no more cure the illicit nature of these
relationships than these relationships could threaten marriage.
But marriage is not completely out of harm's way. Just as early-twentieth-
century lawmakers understood marriage as a powerful cure for illicit sex even
as they feared that certain relationships could threaten marriage, so too do
today's lawmakers imagine marriage as simultaneously powerful and
powerless. Consider, for example, the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which defines marriage for purposes of federal law as a union between a man
and a woman and also stipulates that no state can be forced to recognize a
(1964). Importantly, though, McLaughlin did not deem nonmarital interracial sex licit. See
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196. I explore the relationship between this history and Lawrence in
another essay. See Ariela R. Dubler, What Happened to McLaughlin v. Florida?, 1o6 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (comparing Lawrence to McLaughlin as cases that extended
constitutional protection to certain forms of sex without extending to the couples the right
to marry).
239. Cf Franke, supra note 3 (arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence imposed a
marriage-like model on the relationship between Lawrence and Garner).
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same-sex marriage validated by another state. 4 Consider, in particular, the
potential double meaning of "defense" in this context and in the context of the
so-called mini-DOMAs that many states have passed since 1996 defining
marriage as cross-sex for the purposes of state law. 4' On the one hand, DOMA
suggests that marriage can act as a powerful defense against the sociolegal
harm of other forms of sexual intimacy. Marriage remains, the argument goes,
"the core of civilization." 42 In fact, defending state laws limiting marriage to
cross-sex couples, Senator John Cornyn of Texas quoted the exact nineteenth-
century Supreme Court language invoked by the Court in United States v. Bitty.
Marriage, he opined, remains "the sure foundation of all that is stable and
noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which is
the source of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement."" 3 In
particular, supporters of DOMA depicted marriage as "uniquely capable" of
protecting children.2" Children, in this view, existed in the "wreckage" of the
"sexual revolution," and only marriage could remedy their social woes."4s
On the other hand, if marriage remains this powerful force, DOMA
simultaneously suggests that marriage itself needs defending. The Act, after all,
was explicitly created "[t]o define and protect the institution of marriage.
''2
4 6
In fact, DOMA's supporters argued that the Act was necessary to combat
nothing less than an on-going "frontal attack on the institution of marriage. 247
Once again, then, lawmakers have depicted marriage itself as potentially
vulnerable to the taint of illicit sexual practices- this time, the specter of states
recognizing same-sex unions as marital. Once again, in other words, federal
lawmakers have excluded certain couples from the rights of marriage in order
24o. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 11o Star. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified at i U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
241. For a state-by-state list of these laws, see Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2165-94 app.
(2005).
242. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 174o, A Bill To Define and Protect the
Institution of Marriage, 1o4 th Cong. 22 (1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family
Research Council) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 174o].
243. John Cornyn, In Defense of Marriage, NRO: NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 12, 2004,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/cornyn2004o7l2o92i.asp (quoting Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)).
244. Hearing on S. 174o, supra note 242, at 1 (statement of Rep. Canady).
245. Id. at 20 (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family Research Council).
246. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 1, no Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. S 1738c (2000)).
247. Hearing on H.R. 3396, Defense of Marriage Act, Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciay, 1o4th Cong. 37 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr).
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to protect the powers of the very institution of marriage itself. Marriage can
only defend if it is defended. Legal constructions of its power, therefore, only
make visible marriage's persistent weakness as a sociolegal institution capable
of providing order for all intimate relations.
CONCLUSION
In Lawrence v. Texas the Supreme Court situates its opinion within a
particular historical narrative: the history of the enactment and repudiation of
laws banning sodomy. Lawrence, however, is part of another body of legal
history as well. It is part of the history of attempts by federal lawmakers and
judges to define the respective genera of licit and illicit sex. Viewed from this
perspective, Lawrence marks the latest intervention in a legal conversation that
began when Congress enacted the 1907 Immigration Act and the 191o Mann
Act, each of which prohibited the movement of women across borders for
"immoral purposes." Situating the case in this context makes sense of the role
played by marriage in all three of the major opinions in Lawrence-a case in
which no party made any legal claim to marriage, but Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Scalia all understood marriage to be implicated. The Lawrence
Court, like the legislators and judges who crafted and interpreted the "immoral
purpose" provisions, uses marriage to police the line between illicit and licit
sex.
One hundred years ago, however, lawmakers and judges constructed an
isomorphic relationship between marriage/nonmarriage and licit sex/illicit sex.
The "marriage cure" transported sex across the illicit-licit divide. Lawrence
marks the final repudiation of this logic: The Court moved a sexual
relationship from the genus of illicit sex into the genus of licit sex noting
precisely that the relationship made no claim to marriage. As was the case
historically, this judicial move reflects the persistent status of marriage in the
American sociolegal order as a legal institution understood to be
simultaneously tremendously powerful and powerless. Marriage is at once
powerful to confer legal privileges and to shield people from the dangers of
sexual illicitness, and powerless to protect itself from the taint of those very
illicit practices.
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